A Slight Re-telling of the David and Goliath Story: Surprising Power Dynamics in Proxy Relationships by Wang, Ruiyang
Claremont Colleges
Scholarship @ Claremont
CMC Senior Theses CMC Student Scholarship
2019
A Slight Re-telling of the David and Goliath Story:
Surprising Power Dynamics in Proxy Relationships
Ruiyang Wang
This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you by Scholarship@Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in this collection by an authorized
administrator. For more information, please contact scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wang, Ruiyang, "A Slight Re-telling of the David and Goliath Story: Surprising Power Dynamics in Proxy Relationships" (2019). CMC
Senior Theses. 2205.
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/2205





Claremont McKenna College 
 
 


















submitted to  














April 29, 2019 
 
   
 
  
  1 





Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... 2 
Acknowledgment ...................................................................................................................... 3 
Chapter 1: A Re-telling of the David and Goliath Story ...................................................... 4 
Chapter 2: The Theory Chapter ............................................................................................. 6 
Chapter 3: Cuba, An International Paladin ........................................................................ 21 
Chapter 4: United States, the Kurds, and ISIS ................................................................... 50 
Chapter 5: Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 90 
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................... 97 
 
  
  2 
Abstract 
This thesis discusses how local forces, despite being the weaker actor in a proxy 
relationship, manipulate external powers’ support to pursue their own objectives. Three 
factors – practical advantage, relative will, and diverging objectives – explain this 
counterintuitive power dynamic. First, local forces have better local knowledge, more 
extensive networks, and greater legitimacy, which give them leverage and make them 
desirable partners. Second, local forces' involvement is often existential rather than selective; 
unlike external powers, local forces are thus unconstrained by domestic political 
vulnerabilities. This enables them to close the significant power gap with external powers. 
Third, local forces' objectives may diverge from their sponsors', creating incentives for 
exploitation and manipulation of external support to pursue their own agenda, regardless of 
the external powers’ interests. These three factors effectively explain the dynamic between 
the Soviet Union and Cuba during the Angolan civil war and the relationship between the U.S. 
and the Kurds in the fight against ISIS. Cuba mostly operated within the Soviet strategic 
parameters, while at the same time manipulating Soviet support to forward its own interests 
in Africa. The Kurds manipulated U.S. support while fighting ISIS to acquire territories and 
to pursue autonomy and independence, goals inconsistent with US interests. Further 
research is still needed to identify under what conditions local partners will wield this 
counterintuitive power, since there also are cases in which this does not take place. 
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Chapter 1: A Re-telling of the David and Goliath Story 
The story about how David defeated Goliath, the giant, by throwing a stone at Goliath’s 
weak spot on his head, has been frequently used by scholars to demonstrate how the weak 
defeat the strong. This paper, however, focuses on another intriguing question that also 
concerns the dynamic between the weak and the strong in the international system. In order to 
better illustrate the question, it is useful to apply the setting of David and Goliath to a new 
storyline. Instead of David challenging Goliath, David would be fighting one of his own kind. 
The conflict would then catch Goliath’s attention and lure him to intervene through 
supporting David. Despite Goliath’s power advantage in this relationship, he could not fully 
control David. In fact, Goliath is sometimes even susceptible to David’s manipulation.  
What happens in this story describes the relationship between external powers and local 
forces in a variety of intervention cases. Through supporting and relying on local forces, the 
external power intends to intervene and achieve certain objectives in the local sphere without 
deploying its own armed forces.1 John Mearsheimer defines such strategy as offshore 
balancing.2 Mearsheimer is a strong advocate for offshore balancing and perceives it as the 
best strategy to prevent the emergence of a regional hegemon at a relatively low cost, to 
counter the rise of terrorism, and to control nuclear proliferation.3 Richard Nixon made a 
similar argument in his famous “silent majority” speech about the Vietnam war in November 
1969, in which he introduced a strategy shift from “Americanization” to “Vietnamization.”4 
Instead of the U.S. taking the lead to fight the war, Nixon wanted the South Vietnamese army 
to take control over the conflict.5 The U.S. would start to withdraw forces from Vietnam but 
                                                 
1 John J. Mearsheimer, "Imperial by Design." The National Interest, no. 111 (2011): 18, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/42897726.  
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid., 31-33.  
4 "Vietnamization," Miller Center, October 11, 2017, https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/educational-
resources/vietnamization.  
5 "Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam - November 3, 1969 » Richard Nixon Foundation," Richard 
Nixon Foundation, January 19, 2018, https://www.nixonfoundation.org/2017/09/address-nation-war-vietnam-
november-3-1969/. 
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increase the provision of training and equipment for the South Vietnamese army.6 Nixon said 
in his speech that this strategy was inspired by the words of a leader of another Asian country, 
who said “when you are trying to assist another nation defend its freedom, U.S. policy should 
be to help them fight the war but not to fight the war for them.”7 The incentive to increase 
support for the South Vietnamese army was that the U.S. could withdraw faster and sooner as 
South Vietnam became stronger.8  
While, in theory, Mearsheimer’s offshore balancing and Nixon’s Vietnamization are 
designed in a way that enables external powers to effectively achieve their objectives, in 
reality, it is not always the case. As we have described in the modified version of the David 
and Goliath story, there is no guarantee that the external power has complete control over 
local forces, whom it intends to use to achieve its objectives. In fact, the local forces, though 
being the weaker actor in the partnership, could even manage to manipulate external support 
to forward their own interests. This paper intends to explain why and how this rather 
counterintuitive dynamic could happen. 
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Chapter 2: The Theory Chapter 
This chapter builds a theoretical foundation for this paper and argues that local forces 
can manipulate external powers in cases of intervention mainly due to three reasons. First, 
local forces have practical advantages over external powers, in terms of more extensive local 
presence, better knowledge and deeper understanding of the local politics, economy, and 
society, well-established local networks and higher legitimacy in the local sphere. Second, an 
internal conflict can pose an imminent threat to the survival of local forces but not to that of 
the external powers.9 The different levels of stakes involved would shape the actors’ relative 
will to fight and subject them to various levels of political vulnerability.10 Local forces would 
be fighting for survival, which results in strong resolve to fight and few controversies over 
the necessity of fighting.11 External powers, however, would only be fighting for geopolitical 
interests, which requires a swift victory to justify the purpose of intervention and the 
allocation of resources.12 Third, it is almost impossible for the objectives of external powers 
and local forces to be perfectly aligned. The relationship between the two actors then faces 
the problem of agency slack.13  If the local forces’ objectives significantly diverge from those 
of the external powers, they would have strong incentives to manipulate the external support 
to pursue their own objectives, which could actually contradict the external powers’ 
interests.14 These three factors will be discussed in more detail and then applied to specific 
cases in the following chapters.  
Compared to the external power, local forces are not only better informed about local 
politics, economy and society but also better connected with the local community. The 
                                                 
9 Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," Power, Strategy 
and Security, 1983, 132, doi:10.1515/9781400886326-008. 
10 Ivan Arreguín-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars," International Security, 2001, 96, 
doi:10.1017/cbo9780511521645. 
11 Mack, 132. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Idean Salehyan, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and David E. Cunningham, "Explaining External Support for 
Insurgent Groups," International Organization 65, no. 04 (2011): 714, doi:10.1017/s0020818311000233. 
14 Ibid. 
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possession of these crucial resources gives the local forces a practical advantage over the 
external power. Philipp Münch and Alex Veit argue that the access to a range of “decisive 
resources like information, protection or community support” makes local actors “necessary 
for external actors to achieve certain ends in the local sphere.”15 Local actors in possession of 
these resources that help external actors achieve their goals are defined as intermediaries.16 
Münch and Veit also point out that external power has relied on intermediaries to project and 
retain power in the local sphere since the era of colonization.17 During colonization, colonial 
intermediaries, including chiefs, soldiers, and translators, facilitated the colonial power to 
rule at a relatively low cost and helped sustain the long-distance ruling.18 In contemporary 
efforts of peacebuilding or nation building, external powers have continued to partner with 
local forces both to create a sense of “efficiency and sustainability” in the minds of the 
western audience and to reduce costs that would otherwise be necessary to either contain the 
conflict or govern the territory and population.19 Similar to Münch and Veit’s arguments, 
Idean Salehyan, Kristian Gleditsch, and David Cunningham also argue that among many 
reasons why external powers support local forces, local advantage, including more legitimacy, 
better information sources, and less pushback from the community, has always been 
important in the external actor’s calculations.20  
While scholars mentioned above argue that local forces’ practical advantage over local 
resources makes them desirable partners for external powers, Jennifer Taw makes a similar 
argument but from a different perspective by arguing that without a thorough understanding 
of the local power dynamic, all foreign policies, including intervention, could only achieve a 
                                                 
15 Philipp Münch and Alex Veit, "Intermediaries of Intervention: How Local Power Brokers Shape External 
Peace- and State-Building in Afghanistan and Congo," International Peacekeeping 25, no. 2 (2017): 270, 
doi:10.1080/13533312.2017.1411808. 
16 Ibid., 267. 
17 Ibid., 270. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20Salehyan et al, 714. 
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filtered effect in the target country.21 Taw argues that “no foreign policy, regardless of intent, 
is immune to the effects of internal politics; a policy’s success will depend to at least some 
extent – and sometimes entirely – on how the many actors within the country at which it is 
directed respond.”22 Policies that ignore the effect of the dynamic in the target state could 
easily result in a “distributive domestic response,” which means that the intended outcome of 
a foreign policy is filtered through the response of local actors competing for power and 
influence.23 Local actors can influence the policy outcome through actions that “slow, block 
or pervert” the implementation of policies regardless of their objectives.24 The extent and 
under what circumstances that the distributive domestic response would filter the intended 
outcome of a policy depend on three factors: the types of political system, the level of 
stability and the number of actors in the target state.25 According to Taw’s model that focuses 
on these three factors, the policy-producing state would have the least control over the 
outcome of its foreign policy when the policy is implemented in a failed state, where the 
widespread instability can create abundant opportunities for the external power to upset the 
“relative balance of power among domestic actors” and the large number of actors present in 
the failed state can further complicate the task of distinguishing which actors are influencing 
the policy outcome in what ways.26 The instability and power vacuum in failed states tend to 
lure external powers to intervene and project power.27 What comes with these opportunities 
of exploitation, however, are local complexities and challenges, as a result of the lack of 
central authority and the large number of actors. These will intensely filter the external 
powers’ policy outcome.28 In other words, if the distributive domestic response is not 
                                                 
21 Jennifer Morrison Taw, "Distributive Domestic Response," Review of International Studies 37, no. 03 




25 Ibid., 1360-1363. 
26 Ibid., 1361. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., 1363. 
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understood, it cannot be mitigated or compensated, which makes it more likely for “internal 
power politics to trump international power politics.”29  
In the case of an intervention, the intended outcome is for the local forces to stay under 
the external powers’ control and utilize resources effectively to fulfill the external powers’ 
objectives. If the external powers have insufficient knowledge about the local politics and 
society, they may intervene blindly, which creates opportunities for the local actors to use 
their practical advantage to manipulate the resources provided by the external actors to 
forward their own interests.30 In addition, Münch and Veit also argue that external powers 
tend to favor local actors that are not only more competent, in terms of intelligence and 
resources, but also more well connected in the society.31 Although more competent local 
actors are more likely to deliver the desirable outcome, they are also more capable and 
mindful of protecting their own positions, and therefore, less dependent on external support 
and more difficult to control.32  
The second reason that local forces can manipulate external powers despite power 
disadvantage is about the relative will to fight. Ivan Arreguín-Toft and Andrew Mack’s 
discussion on how weak actors defeat strong actors in asymmetric conflicts can provide 
important insights into this argument.33 When the power disparity between the strong and the 
weak in a conflict is significant, the conflict is described as asymmetric.34 Arreguín-Toft 
coded a conflict asymmetric when the strong actor’s power, which is comprised of armed 
forces and population, is greater than or equal to five times the weak actor’s power.35 Mack 
describes the asymmetric relationship as “a function of the differences in level of industrial 
                                                 
29 Ibid., 1381. 
30 Ibid., 1364-1370. 
31 Münch and Veit, 270. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Arreguín-Toft and Mack. 
34 Arreguín-Toft, 96. 
35 Ibid. 
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and technological capability of the two sides” and defines it as a “resource asymmetry.”36 
While it is intuitive to assume that power assures victory, and consequently, strong actors 
should almost always win, statistics and historical evidence show exceptions. Weak actors 
won around 30 percent of asymmetric conflicts between 1800 and 1998, and the percentage 
of the number of conflicts won by weaker actors has increased over time.37 Examples in 
which weaker actors win wars include the first Indochina War, the Vietnam War, and the 
Algerian War.38 To explain this rather counterintuitive outcome of these asymmetric wars, 
Mack and Arreguín-Toft have each proposed an argument. 
Mack argues that the significant power disparity makes the conflict outcome more 
salient to the weak than to the strong, which results in an interest asymmetry and a difference 
in the level of political vulnerability.39 For the strong actor, its overall power advantage 
guarantees its homeland security because, according to Mack, the weak actor does not have 
sufficient capability to launch an invasion.40 For the weak actor, however, the strong 
opponent can invade and even occupy its territory, which threatens its survival.41 While the 
weak actor’s interest in the conflict is about survival, the strong actor’s interest depends on 
the conflict’s “proximity to major power centers and intense conflict zones, and the risks it 
poses both regionally and globally.”42 Similar to Mack, David Carment and Dane Rowlands 
also argue that the salience of the conflict to an actor is “largely exogenous and at best only 
marginally sensitive to policy choices or manipulation.”43 In other words, even if 
policymakers intend to manipulate perceptions, the salience of a conflict is derived from “a 
                                                 
36 Mack, 133. 
37 Arreguín-Toft, 97. 
38 Ibid., 118. 
39 Mack, 130. 
40 Ibid., 128. 
41 Ibid., 132. 
42 David Carment and Dane Rowlands, "Three’s Company: Evaluating Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate 
Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no. 5 (October 1998): 579, doi:10.1177/0022002798042005003. 
43 Ibid. 
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geostrategic context,” which should be widely known and stable in the short-term.44 If the 
conflict is widely known to be of relatively low salience to the actor, the strong actor’s 
involvement lacks political credibility.45 In general, Mack argues that the weak fight a “total” 
war whereas the strong only fight a “limited” war.46  
Due to the asymmetry in salience and interest, the two actors would adopt different 
methods and attitudes toward the war. The weak actor would perceive the war as a total war 
of survival, which then justifies the mobilization of all armed forces, population and 
resources.47 Such an imminent threat would also provoke a strong sense of nationalism and 
unite the previously divided or even hostile domestic groups to fight against the common 
enemy.48 The strong actor, however, would face a limited war, which makes a full-scale 
mobilization and deployment politically impossible and unnecessary.49 Constituents would be 
more concerned about the opportunity cost of the resources allocated for the war when it is 
not an issue of survival. More importantly, given the significant power disparity, the strong 
actor would expect to achieve its objectives with limited commitments in a short period of 
time.50 If this were not the case, and the expected outcome were continuously delayed while 
the strong actor kept on building up its efforts, the strong actor would face a range of 
criticisms and doubts from domestic political and social institutions questioning whether to 
continue engaging in the war.51 Facing these domestic controversies, the strong actor can 
either increase forces, which would generate more costs and the victory is not guaranteed, or 
withdraw, which may risk looking incompetent and damage its credibility.52 Mack points out 
that strong democratic actors are more vulnerable to domestic constraints because, unlike 
                                                 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., 580. 
46 Mack, 132. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., 133. 
49 Ibid., 132. 
50 Arreguín-Toft, 105. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
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totalitarian states, a democracy cannot censor the media or block information.53 Although 
democracies would face more pressure from domestic checks and balances, the media, and 
the public, totalitarian states can also be forced to analyze the costs and benefits of the war 
when ruling elites’ interests are threatened.54 
Arreguín-Toft mostly agrees with Mack that relative interests explain strong actors’ 
domestic political vulnerability, yet he points out that Mack’s argument is the “weakest when 
explaining actor interests as a function of relative power, and strongest when explaining 
strong-actor failure as a consequence of political vulnerability.”55 Arreguín-Toft challenges 
the connection between relative power and relative interest by arguing that although the 
outcome of one distant war does not pose any threat to the strong actor’s survival, a defeat in 
an asymmetric conflict may be perceived as a signal of weakness and incompetence that 
would threaten its leading position.56 If the perception of a one-time defeat is “intensified by 
domino logic,” the strong actor might panic about the effect of cumulative loss on its 
survival.57 Additionally, Arreguín-Toft argues that the strong actor’s resolve to win the war 
would drastically increase after it enters the war even if its interests are initially peripheral.58 
In sum, the power disparity does not always result in an interest asymmetry.59 When the 
conflict is perceived as being more important, the strong actor would face fewer political 
constraints that would otherwise weaken the actor’s will to fight.60 Since Mack’s interest 
asymmetry argument seems to have oversimplified the problem, Arreguín-Toft introduces 
strategic interaction to refine Mack’s theory and to better explain “the conditions under which 
political vulnerability causes strong actors to lose asymmetric wars.”61 
                                                 
53 Mack, 143. 
54 Ibid., 143-144.  
55 Arreguín-Toft, 99. 





61 Ibid., 99. 
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Arreguín-Toft’s strategic interaction theory argues that weak actors are more likely to 
win asymmetric wars through opposite-approach interactions.62 He separates attack and 
defense strategies into direct attack/defense and indirect attack/defense, in which direct 
approaches target the enemy’s capacity to fight whereas indirect approaches aim at the 
enemy’s will to fight.63 When the two actors interact using same approach (direct-direct, 
indirect-indirect), the situation favors the strong because the relative material power 
advantage enables it to target the weak actor’s army and defeat it quickly.64 On the other hand, 
when the two actors interact using opposite approach (direct attack-indirect defense, indirect 
attack-direct defense), the weak can manage to deflect the strong actor’s power advantage 
and prolong the conflict, which exposes the strong to domestic pressure.65 Statistics support 
this argument: strong actors won 76% of the asymmetric wars dominated by same-approach 
interactions between 1800 and 1998, while weak actors won 63% of the conflicts dominated 
by opposite-approach interactions.66 To sum up, Arreguín-Toft builds his argument on top of 
Mack’s theory and argues that weak actors are more likely to win asymmetric wars through 
opposite-approach interactions, which effectively target and attack the strong actor’s political 
vulnerability – the main reason why the strong actors pull out of a war prior to achieving their 
objectives.67   
To apply Mack and Arreguín-Toft’s arguments to the relationship between external 
powers and local forces, we would notice that the relative will and political vulnerability 
arguments are still applicable even though the local forces are not fighting the external 
powers in an asymmetric war. Instead, they form an alliance against other local powers. The 
local forces would still have a stronger resolve to fight because a defeat in the internal 
                                                 
62 Ibid., 110. 
63 Ibid., 100-104. 
64 Ibid., 112. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid., 97. 
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conflict can pose an imminent threat to their survival. The security of the external powers’ 
territories and populations, however, are not under threat. While the power disparity does 
reflect the external powers’ better military and technological capability, their limited interests 
and high expectations also make them more politically vulnerable. Just as Mack and 
Arreguín-Toft argued, the external powers would face pressure from their domestic political 
system demanding a quick victory to justify the resources and personnel allocated for the 
intervention. When it becomes obvious that the intervention faces significant doubts from the 
intervening country, the local forces would not expect a long-term relationship, and therefore, 
would not mind sabotaging the relationship through manipulation if given the chance.68  
Apart from the local forces’ practical advantage over local resources and their stronger 
will to fight, the third factor that may lead to manipulation is the misalignment of objectives. 
Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham use the principal-agent framework to explain external 
support for rebel groups and argue that external support for rebel groups depends on the 
calculations of both the supply side – the external power – and the demand side – the rebel 
groups.69 Although the focus of Salehyan et al.’s article is on external support for rebel 
groups, the principal-agent framework is also applicable and useful in explaining the 
relationship between external powers and local forces, including both rebel groups and local 
governments, in a broader sense. On the supply side, external powers may plan to achieve a 
variety of objectives through intervention, such as to project influence on other states’ 
behaviors and policies, to promote certain values and ideologies, and to shape the outcome of 
an internal conflict.70 To achieve these objectives, external powers can use coercive 
bargaining, including sanctions and embargo, launch an interstate war, or “delegate the 
                                                 
68 Carment and Rowland, 579-580. 
69 Salehyan et al, 714. 
70 Hans J. Morgenthau, "To Intervene or Not to Intervene." Foreign Affairs 45, no. 3 (1967): 427-29. 
doi:10.2307/20039247. 
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conflict to local forces.”71 Salehyan et al. argue that similar to coercion and invasion, 
delegating the conflict to local forces is “a tactic that states may employ in weakening their 
enemies.”72 While choosing from their toolkit of tactics, states would conduct a cost-benefit 
analysis on each tactic because all choices “entail important trade-offs.” 73  
Compared to an interstate war, intervention through supporting local forces provides 
external powers with mainly two advantages. First, delegating the conflict to local forces 
generates fewer costs, in terms of both economic resources and casualties, than starting a 
war.74 While intervention might still lead to skepticisms over its necessity in the domestic 
political system, it would generate far less “domestic war weariness and discontent” than 
dragging a state into an open war.75 Second, the relative secrecy of intervention protects the 
external power from international condemnation and pressure.76 Since it is much more 
difficult to find concrete evidence to prove the link between an external power and a local 
force, the international society is less likely to react in a defensive way that challenges the 
legitimacy of the external power’s presence.77 Additionally, it is not the external powers’ 
soldiers on the ground, which makes it a lot easier for the external powers to distance 
themselves from the local forces in cases of brutality and war crimes.78  
While these advantages seem to make delegation a desirable choice, there are always 
trade-offs. Different from an interstate war, where the principals – the external powers – have 
full control over their objectives and the means to achieve such objectives, delegation to 
agents – the local forces – can lead to “potential agency slack or loss of autonomy.”79 The 
problem for agency slack would be the most severe if the local forces’ objectives and 
                                                 
71 Salehyan et al, 712. 
72 Ibid. 
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preferences do not align with that of the external powers.80 Salehyan et al. argue that in order 
to reduce the potential for a loss of agency, external powers should choose to support forces 
that have similar ethnicity, religion, language or culture.81 However, such choices are not 
always available, and the alignment of objectives is not guaranteed even if the principals and 
the agents share those characteristics. Besides, in a constantly changing fighting environment, 
local forces’ preferences and objectives could easily change. When the problem of agency 
slack happens, the external powers start to loss autonomy and control over their “foreign 
policies and the conduct of the conflict.”82 Local forces could use the resources provided by 
their external sponsors to pursue their own interests that do not necessarily align with their 
sponsors.83 According to Salehyan et al., the agency slack can take many forms, including 
“devoting suboptimal effort to the conflict with the resources provided; engaging in 
unwelcome or egregious behavior such as war crimes; diverting resources toward other, 
undesired, objectives; or in some cases, using the resources supplied against the patron 
itself.”84 In addition, states are more likely to choose interstate war over delegation when the 
internal conflict is “absolutely critical to the vital interests of the state.”85 As mentioned 
above in the arguments of Mack, Carment, and Rowlands, the salience of the conflict affects 
the relative interest of the state, which is consistent with a state’s geopolitical interests, and 
consequently, widely known and not susceptible to politicians’ manipulation.86 As a result, a 
state’s decision to delegate the conflict to local forces is by itself a signal of lack of interests, 
which makes it hard to convince the local forces to obey the external powers’ orders in 
exchange for resources in the long run.  
                                                 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid., 715. 




86 Mack, 142. 
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On the demand side, local forces also face a trade-off in making the decision of whether 
to accept support from an external power. According to Salehyan et al., local forces have two 
priorities that can be in conflict with each other. First, they want to maximize resources at 
their disposal to win the war.87 As mentioned above, Salehyan et al. focus on the rebel 
organizations and they point out that compared to the national government, rebel groups are 
usually at a resource disadvantage.88 To broaden the scope of this argument, almost all local 
forces are at a resource disadvantage compared to external powers, which means that local 
forces would always have something to gain from the external powers’ support. 
Correspondingly, when the power disparity is significant, the external powers would have a 
lot to offer, including “access to money, equipment, training, sanctuary, and personnel.”89 
These resources are especially valuable to local forces at the initial stage of the conflict, since 
it can be hard for the local forces to “mobilize a significant military capacity” in a short 
period of time.90 And a continual supply of these resources from the external powers would 
still be beneficial because it would “significantly augment the resource base.”91 The second 
thing that local forces would want is to retain autonomy over their objectives and their 
actions of achieving these objectives.92 Salehyan et al. argue that the rebel groups’ objectives 
could range from gaining more political power, including “greater role in the national 
government or more territories,” to acquiring more economic benefits, including “personal 
enrichment and material rewards.”93 Although the resources provided by external powers are 
attractive, they always “come with strings attached.”94 The principal will want “ some degree 
of control over the rebel’s agenda,” which forces the rebel groups to give up “some control 
                                                 
87 Salehyan et al, 715. 




92 Ibid., 715. 
93 Ibid., 716. 
94 Ibid. 
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over their aims and tactics.”95 Besides, relying too much on the external power also puts the 
local forces at the risk of looking incompetent and losing legitimacy if the local community 
perceive them as “pawns of a foreign power.”96  
Due to the tradeoff between resources and autonomy, Salehyan et al. argue that local 
forces would prefer domestic support base over external patronage.97 For stronger local 
forces that have more access to domestic resources and control over tax revenues from 
controlled territories, the costs of external patronage would outweigh the benefits, which 
gives them fewer incentives to accept external support.98 For weaker actors that are not able 
to mobilize enough funding or personnel, they would be more willing to exchange autonomy 
for resources.99 However, given the embedded conflict between the local forces’ two main 
objectives, they would always have incentives to fight for more autonomy when given the 
chance. The incentives would be stronger if the objectives and preferences between the 
external powers and local forces are severely misaligned.100 In this case, the foreign 
sponsorship would be likely to “entail unwelcome constraints” on local forces through 
forcing them to act in a way that achieve the external powers’ objectives at the cost of the 
local forces’ benefits.101 While local forces endure more unwelcome constraints and gain 
more power through external support, they would have both the motivation and the capacity 
to deflect the external control and to manipulate external resources to forward their own 
interests at the expense of their external sponsors.102   
To sum up this chapter, there are mainly three reasons why local actors, though at a 
power disadvantage, could manipulate external sponsors’ support. First, local forces have a 
                                                 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid., 717. 
97 Ibid., 716. 




102 Ibid., 714. 
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practical advantage, meaning better understanding of local politics and better local network, 
over external powers. As demonstrated by the alliance between external powers and local 
forces during colonization and state building, access to local intelligence and resources 
creates strong incentives for external powers to support local actors. The other side of the 
argument is that without sufficient understanding of the local politics, external powers’ 
foreign policy would be filtered through the power struggle among local actors and only 
achieve a limited outcome. In order to achieve the intended outcome of their intervention 
policy, external powers are motivated to rely on local forces for intelligence and connections, 
which gives local forces power over external actors and exposes external actors to the risk of 
manipulation. Besides, external powers would prefer to partner with more competent local 
forces, which makes them less dependent on external support, more mindful of their own 
position, and therefore, more difficult to control.  
Second, compared to external powers, local forces have stronger resolve to fight and 
suffer from fewer political vulnerability. Local forces have stronger resolve to fight because 
they have higher stakes involved in the conflict – a defeat in the conflict can annihilate the 
entire local force but pose no threat to external powers’ homeland. Due to the significant 
power disparity between external powers and local forces, external powers would be more 
politically vulnerable, as their constituents would expect a swift victory to justify the purpose 
of intervention and the allocated resources and personnel. If external powers fail to achieve 
the expected outcome efficiently, they would then face pressure and doubts from their 
domestic political system, some of which would demand a termination of intervention. Once 
the local forces perceive that the alliance with external powers is not a long-term relationship, 
they would not put in efforts to maintain the relationship and would be tempted to sabotage it 
through manipulation if given the chance.  
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Third, the misalignment of objectives between external powers and local forces subjects 
the relationship to the problem of agency slack. For external powers (the principal), 
delegating the conflict to local actors has mainly two advantages – lower costs and more 
secrecy – with a drawback of less control over their objectives and the actions of achieving 
them. For local forces (the agent), the tradeoff is between accepting resources from external 
sponsors and sacrificing autonomy over their own agenda, since resources mostly come with 
strings attached. Given the inherent conflict between resources and autonomy in the 
principal-agent framework, local forces would always have incentives to break free from 
external control and to gain more autonomy. These incentives would be stronger if the 
objectives of the two groups are severely misaligned. Even though external powers could 
choose groups that share certain characteristics to mitigate the problem, the risk of agency 
slack would still be present. Additionally, states tend to choose interstate war over delegation 
when the conflict at hand is of vital interests. The decision to delegate the conflict to a local 
agent is by itself a signal of a lack of resolve, which therefore, indicates a fragile alliance.  
The analysis of these three factors will be applied to two cases in the following chapters. 
The first case focuses on the relationship between the Soviet Union and Cuba in Angola 
while the second case discusses the relationship between the U.S. and the Kurds in fighting 
ISIS in Syria and Iraq.  
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Chapter 3: Cuba, An International Paladin103  
The conflict in Angola started in 1961 as a revolution against Portuguese colonization.104 
During the revolution, three local guerrilla forces – the Popular Movement for the Liberation 
of Angola (MPLA) led by Agostinho Neto, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola 
(FNLA) led by Holden Roberto, and the National Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola (UNITA) led by Jonas Savimbi – fought for control over Angola.105 Division among 
these local forces was characterized by “ethnic, territorial, and language barriers,” which was 
then reinforced by Portuguese colonial policies, including “press censorship, travel 
restrictions, and constant police harassment,” in place to prevent joint indigenous 
opposition.106 These policies significantly restricted the “ranges of action, life-spans, and 
political vision” of the guerrilla forces, which made it almost impossible for their leaders to 
overcome ethnic and regional boundaries to build an alliance that jointly fought for 
independence.107 As a result, the Angolan local forces spent most of the time fighting each 
other in the first ten years of the revolution, and therefore, had few success against the 
Portuguese colonial power.108 The situation started to change in April 1974, when the Armed 
Forces Movement in the Portuguese military overthrew the Caetano dictatorship in Lisbon.109 
The left-leaning new government in Lisbon had no interest in retaining the colonies, which 
were perceived as a burden and an embarrassment, and intended to gradually withdraw from 
Angola.110 While Portugal's decision to withdraw removed a major obstacle for the liberation 
movements, it also “set off a mad scramble for influence in Angola.”111  
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After the April 1974 coup, external powers, including China, Zaire, the U.S., the Soviet 
Union, Cuba, and South Africa started to intervene through backing local forces that 
supported their strategies and ideologies.112 Through providing support, external powers 
added an ideological element to the national liberation movement, exacerbated the division 
among local forces, and, eventually, turned Angola into a chessboard for power struggle.113  
China and Zaire started to provide arms and technical support to both FNLA and UNITA 
in the early 1960s.114 Support from China stopped during China’s Cultural Revolution (1966-
1970), which forced FNLA to rely completely on Zaire, while UNITA had to depend on 
itself.115 China resumed its support for both the FNLA and UNITA after the coup in 1974.116 
While the U.S. mostly held back from intervening in Angola in the 1960s, the U.S. 
government, under pressure from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the then-
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, recognized Angola’s importance after the 1974 coup and 
started to send arms and aids through Zaire to FNLA.117 When the FNLA and UNITA 
officially joined forces against the MPLA in the summer of 1975, the U.S. provided support 
for the FNLA-UNITA alliance.118 Similar to China’s relationship with the FNLA, the Soviet 
aid for the MPLA went on and off during the 1960s.119 The Soviet Union stopped providing 
aid to the MPLA twice, once in 1963 and once in 1974, when the Soviets thought the MPLA 
was going to lose the war.120 By November 1974, the Soviets resumed arms shipment to the 
MPLA.121 Compared to the Soviets, the Cubans were more consistent with their support for 
the MPLA. Cuba sent several hundred advisers to train MPLA fighters in 1966, and some 
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stayed with the guerilla forces into the 1970s.122 After the civil war broke out in March 1975, 
Cuba sent in more military advisers and later armed forces to fight with the MPLA.123 South 
Africa’s intervention did not start until the eruption of the civil war.124 In July 1975, South 
Africa “engaged in parallel covert operations” with the U.S. in Angola, and then directly 
intervened with military forces in October to remove the MPLA from the Angolan capital 
Luanda.125 
In order to achieve a smooth and orderly withdrawal from Angola, the new Portuguese 
government arranged a meeting in January 1975 for the three local force leaders to meet in 
Alvor, Portugal, to discuss cooperation for “a peaceful transition to independence.”126 The 
three leaders signed the Alvor agreement, which depicted a bright future for Angola: a 
transitional government until the Portuguese finished withdrawal in November 1975, a 
national army comprised of forces from the three groups facilitating governance, and open 
elections in October 1975 for a new post-colonial government.127 Although the agreement 
was signed by all three leaders and officially endorsed by the external powers, including the 
U.S., the Soviet Union, and China, neither the local forces nor the external actors had 
confidence in the temporary truce.128 Ten years’ fighting during the revolution made 
cooperation almost impossible for the local forces.129 Arms and aid that continued to flow 
from the external powers to the local forces fed into the local forces’ ambition, strengthened 
their resolve to fight, and assured the external powers that with their support, their local 
partners were more likely to take control over Angola.130  
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Emboldened by the external support, the local forces acted more aggressively. In March 
1975, the FNLA launched an attack against the MPLA forces in Luanda and in the northern 
territories, which marked the outbreak of the Angolan civil war.131 After the attack, both the 
Soviet Union and Cuba increased their support – the Soviets increased the supply of aid while 
Cuba dispatched military commander Flavio Bravo to talk to the MPLA leader Neto.132 After 
Neto identified his group’s main problem as not knowing how to use the Soviet weapons, 
Cuba sent 230 advisers to Angola to operate four training camps for the MPLA forces.133 
Upon the MPLA’s request, Cuba sent in more advisers in the following months. The number 
of Cuban advisers in Angola reached around 1,500 in mid-October.134 With the Soviet 
weapons and the Cuban advisors, the MPLA took control over Luanda on July 9, and 
gradually won over “twelve of the fifteen provinces.” 135 The MPLA’s control over the 
capital severely unnerved FNLA, UNITA, and South Africa – if the MPLA were still in 
control over Luanda by the time the Portuguese left, it “would be able to claim de facto 
control of Angola.”136 Facing this dire situation, the FNLA and UNITA formally joined 
forces, South Africa directly intervened in the war with 5,000 to 10,000 troops, and Zaire 
launched an attack against MPLA from the north.137 Even with the Soviet and Cuban aid and 
advisors, the MPLA was no match for the South African forces.138 The South African forces 
effectively halted the MPLA’s advance and were “less than 200 miles from Luanda” on the 
last day of the Portuguese withdrawal.139 Facing South Africa’s invasion, Cuba felt obliged to 
intervene with military forces to save the MPLA from the defeat.140 Havana started deploying 
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troops in November.141 The rate of deployment reached 400 troops per week by December 
and 1,000 per week by January 1976.142 Cuba’s support proved to be efficient and successful. 
The MPLA stopped the “South African advance in the south and the Zairean-FNLA offensive 
in the north” by December 1975, pushed the South Africans across the Angola-Namibia 
border by January 1976, and forced the FNLA to retreat back to Zaire by mid-February.143 
Since most of the opponents were forced to leave Angola, MPLA took control over the 
country in March.144  
As demonstrated above, the conflict in Angola was extremely complicated with a variety 
of local actors and external actors involved. Among multiple external power-local force 
relationships in Angola, the following discussion will focus on the relationship between the 
Soviet Union and Cuba to best demonstrate this paper’s argument.  
 
The Soviet Union and Cuba: Cuba as an international paladin 
This section discusses the relationship between the Soviet Union and Cuba during their 
intervention in Angola. Even though Cuba was not a local force in the Angolan civil war, the 
dynamic between the Soviet Union and Cuba has two main characteristics that make it 
relevant and useful in testing this paper’s argument. First, the Soviet Union provided support 
for the Cuban ground forces to achieve a set of objectives in Angola and in Africa.145 During 
the Cold War, when the two superpowers were competing for influence around the world, it 
is reasonable to assume that the Soviet Union had a set of objectives that it hoped to achieve 
in Africa. Whether these objectives were deliberate and expansionist in nature or reactive and 
opportunistic will be discussed in more detail later.146 In the case of Angola, the Soviet Union 
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was not willing to take the risk of sending in combat forces or military advisers.147 Instead, it 
provided aid and arms to support the MPLA and the Cuban ground forces.148 Cuba, on the 
other hand, deployed 15,000 to 18,000 troops to fight alongside the MPLA between 
November 1975 and March 1976.149 Before intervening in Angola, Cuba had already 
developed a military presence in the 1960s in a number of African countries.150 Given its 
direct military intervention during the Angolan civil war and its relatively long-term military 
presence in the region, Cuba could be analyzed in lieu of a local force with the Soviet Union 
as the external power in their relationship.  
Second, a significant power disparity existed between the Soviet Union and Cuba, and 
the Cuban intervention would not have been possible without the Soviet support.151 As a 
developing country with a small economy, Cuba had limited industrial capacity, a narrow 
product and export range, and inadequate technological development.152 As a result, the 
Cuban economy had to rely heavily upon trade with the Soviet Union and subsidies provided 
by the Soviet Union.153 Its army had to depend on the Soviet arms supply and technology 
support.154 Without the support from Moscow, Havana would not have been able to sustain 
its expansive presence – around 38,000 Cuban troops by the spring of 1978 – in Africa.155 
Although scholars debate the dynamic between the Soviet Union and Cuba, these two 
characteristics are among the shared assumptions underlying the disagreements.156    
Edward Gonzalez, in his article ‘Cuba, the Soviet Union, and Africa,’ summarizes three 
main interpretations of the relationship between the Soviet Union and Cuba.157 First, Cuba is 
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perceived as “a Soviet-direct surrogate” or “an instrument of Soviet foreign policy” in 
Africa.158 Second, the Fidel Castro regime is appreciated as “a self-directed revolutionary 
internationalist” regime, devoted to the mission of “combatting imperialism and promoting 
national liberation and socialism in the Third World.”159 The third interpretation argues that 
instead of acting as a surrogate or a completely independent internationalist regime, Cuba 
was “a self-motivated international paladin which must necessarily operate within the 
parameters of Soviet political and strategic interests in Africa but which nevertheless pursues 
its own objectives in the region.”160 This interpretation is Gonzalez’s main argument, which 
also aligns with this paper’s position that local forces could pursue their own objectives 
through manipulating external support.  
Scholars who perceive Cuba as “a Soviet-direct surrogate” argue that Cuba was directed 
and sponsored by the Soviet Union to intervene in Angola, in order to achieve Soviet political 
and strategic objectives in the region.161 This argument assumes an activist and expansionist 
Soviet strategy in Africa, through which the Soviets could implement their “grand design” 
and pursue their strategic interests in the region.162 The Soviet Union’s intervention in Angola 
was believed to be a part of the grand design, which had two main objectives.  
First, the Soviet Union had high expectations for expanding its political influence in 
Africa through inducing direct and rapid socialist revolutions.163 Jiri Valenta argues that 
Nikita Khrushchev intended to promote socialism in Africa through supporting left-leaning 
local forces in national liberation movements.164 With Soviet support, Khrushchev hoped to 
turn national liberation movements into socialist transitions, which would then expand Soviet 
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political influence in Africa.165 Soviet support for the MPLA in Angola during the early 
1960s has been used as an example to support this argument. John Marcum argues that 
Moscow noticed the Marxist origin of the MPLA and described it as a group that was 
“founded on the initiative of the Communist Party” in a Soviet handbook published in 
1962.166 In addition to the Marxist origin, Neto, the leader of MPLA, made a lot of efforts, 
including maintaining a close relationship with Castro and making contact with the 
Portuguese Communist Party, to convince Moscow that the MPLA had the intention and 
“potential for revolutionary transformations.”167 After picking up these signals, Moscow 
started to send in political and material support for the MPLA in the early 1960s.168 The fact 
that Soviet support started before the U.S.-Soviet détente and the Sino-Soviet rivalry shows 
that intervention in Angola was active, not reactive, planned ahead, and aimed at expanding 
Soviet political influence in Africa.  
Second, the Soviet Union wanted to achieve a “strategic penetration of southern Africa” 
and to contain other external powers’ influence in the region.169 Gonzalez argues that the 
abundance of mineral resources in southern Africa, especially in Angola, created strong 
incentives for the Soviet Union to monopolize access and to maximize economic benefits.170 
The Soviet Union could also benefit from control over Angolan ports, which would 
strengthen the Soviet “blue-water and airlift capabilities.”171 David Rees supports this 
argument by saying that Moscow was not only trying to “create a cluster of Marxist client 
states” that would do its biddings in the power struggle against the West, but also aiming at 
denying the West access to “strategic resources and sea routes.”172 Apart from access to ports 
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and resources, Angola’s geographic location also made its regime type salient to the Soviet 
Union.173 If the MPLA were defeated and Angola were governed by the pro-West and South 
African backed FNLA-UNITA government, southern Africa would be more likely to stay 
under minority white control, which made it hard for the Soviets to project power in the 
region.174 Besides, other left-leaning local forces might lose faith in Soviet support and turn 
to China for protection.175 On the other hand, if the MPLA won the civil war and established 
a pro-Soviet regime, the Soviet Union could use this as an example to encourage more 
transitions to socialism and to recruit more allies in Africa.176  
Following the assumption that the Soviet Union had a “carefully thought out master plan” 
with two clear objectives in Africa, scholars argue that the Soviets had strong and consistent 
incentives to intervene in Angola and southern Africa.177 Cuba, a member of the Communist 
camp, would then turn out to be a useful surrogate for direct Soviet presence on the African 
continent.178 The Cubans were assumed to be in full compliance with and the established 
Soviet policy, which made them nothing more than an instrument at the Soviet disposal that 
could be used to forward the Soviet interests.179 Peter Vanneman and Martin James describe 
the Cuban forces as “a completely new instrument for the Soviet foreign policy,” which was 
employed to intervene in an area that was “far from its own frontiers.”180 T.B. Millar supports 
this argument by saying that the Cubans were “little more than mercenaries in disguise.”181   
While the surrogate argument perceives Cuba as a state that had little autonomy and was 
in full compliance with the Soviet command during the intervention in Angola, the 
internationalist argument portrays the Castro regime as an independent revolutionary power 
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acting at its own will to fight against imperialism and to promote national liberation and 
socialism in Africa.182 In general, two sets of evidence have been used to support this 
argument.  
First, Castro’s strong belief in socialism, opposition to imperialism, and attention to 
Cuba’s leading position in the Third World, created strong incentives for him to intervene.183 
Piero Gleijeses quotes the former Soviet ambassador to the U.S., who said “the Cubans sent 
their troops to Angola on their own initiative without consulting us,” to prove that Cuba was 
not a Soviet surrogate.184 He also quotes from the memoir of Kissinger, who used to support 
the surrogate argument, to show the assumption of Havana being pressured by Moscow to 
intervene in order to “repay the Soviet Union for its military and economic support” as 
invalid.185 Besides, Kissinger recognized Castro’s revolutionary ambition and described him 
as “the most genuine revolutionary leader then in power.”186 Valenta also argues that Castro 
had a revolutionary vision for the Third World and shifted his focus, during the 1960s, from 
Latin America to Africa, where he thought the link of imperialism was the weakest and the 
“possibility for fundamental changes” was the most significant.187 Driven by these 
ideological motivations, Castro invested not only in Angola through consistently supporting 
the MPLA but also in other African countries, including Guinea, Tanzania, Somalia, and 
Mozambique, to demonstrate his readiness to deploy troops on the ground to promote 
socialist revolutions in Africa.188 Compared to Cuba’s readiness, the Soviet attitude was more 
cautious.189 Carla Robbins points out that when Neto approached the Soviets for help after 
South Africa invaded Angola in August 1975, Moscow agreed to send more arms but refused 
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to send in any military personnel.190 Cuba, on the other hand, deployed “500 advisers from 
Castro’s personal guard” to fight alongside the MPLA.191  
The second set of evidence that scholars use to show that Cuba acted on its own will 
focuses on the incoherence and even clashes between the Soviet Union and Cuba about 
policies and military strategies during the intervention.192 Havana made its own decision to 
deploy troops to Angola in November 1975.193 Even when the MPLA was at the brink of 
losing control over Luanda, the Soviet Union did not send in any military personnel.194 In fact, 
the Soviets did not provide any military aircraft to transport the Cubans troops and heavy 
equipments either.195 The Cubans were forced to rely on their own “leaky merchant ships and 
obsolete commercial airplanes” to deliver troops to help the MPLA defend Luanda.196 Even 
though the Soviets started to use transport planes to shuttle Cuban forces in early December, 
the support was still unstable – Moscow had to frequently suspend flights due to official 
protests from Washington.197 Cuba, therefore, had no choice but to use its own transport 
facilities to provide reinforcements for the MPLA.198 If Cuba were the Soviet Union’s 
surrogate, one would expect better coordination and more cohesion in their actions during the 
intervention.199 In addition, there were several occasions when Cuba and the Soviet Union 
were in open opposition. Gleijeses argues that even with evidence suggesting that the 
attempted coup against Neto in May 1977 was backed by the Soviet embassy, or at least, had 
the Soviet consent, the Cubans chose to support Neto against the Russian’s will.200 Andrew 
Young, the then-U.S. ambassador to the UN, made a similar observation while testifying 
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before the Senate by saying that “the Cubans and the Russians haven’t been always united in 
Angola.”201 To sum up, the internationalist argument believes that the Soviet support was 
provided on the basis of shared ideology and Cuba had full control over its decisions and 
actions in Angola, which were motivated by Castro’s personal revolutionary ambition and 
demonstrated by the open disagreements between the Soviet Union and Cuba on strategies of 
intervention in Angola.202  
While both the surrogate and the internationalist arguments are valid and supported by 
evidence, they only tell a part of the story in describing the relationship between the Soviet 
Union and Cuba. An alternative argument, which Gonzalez calls the paladin argument, 
acknowledges both arguments: Cuba’s actions were indeed contained within the boundaries 
set by the Soviet objectives and support, yet it was still operating as “a self-motivated 
international paladin” with motivations that were “far more complex” than simply 
ideology.203 If we apply the three factors identified in the theory model – practical advantage, 
relative will to fight, and misalignment of objectives – to the paladin argument, it becomes 
clear that the paladin argument provides a more comprehensive description of the relationship 
between the two countries in Angola.  
First, Cuba’s military presence in Africa provided the Cubans with a practical advantage 
over the Soviet Union, which could transform into leverage. Second, the Cuban troops on the 
ground and its relative detachment from the Cold War détente gave Cuba greater resolve of 
intervention, fewer domestic restrictions, and stronger incentives to exploit the Soviet 
hesitance toward Angola.204 Third, the complicated nature of Cuba’s objectives created 
strong motivations for Cuba to exploit the war in Angola to prove its value to the Soviet 
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Union.205 Through directly and indirectly influencing the Soviet policy toward Africa, Cuba 
significantly tightened its relationship with the Soviet Union and increased its status in the 
Third World.206   
Practical Advantage 
The first factor identified in the theoretical model is about practical advantage. Local 
forces have a practical advantage over external powers because they have better 
understanding of local politics and better access to local network. Possession of these 
resources – local knowledge and network – makes local forces desirable partners for external 
powers. Taw’s distributive domestic response theory also argues that without a thorough 
understanding of the local power dynamic, the outcome of foreign policies would be 
extensively filtered through the response of local actors. Consequently, external powers 
choose to rely on local forces for intelligence, network, and sometimes even troops, which 
gives local forces power and leverage over the external powers. In the case of the Cuban-
Soviet intervention in Angola, even though Cuba was not a guerrilla force fighting for control 
over Angola, three characteristics of the Cuban intervention – long-term military presence in 
the region, greater legitimacy in the local society, and military personnel on the ground 
during the conflict – allowed Cuba to take on the same role as a local force and enjoy 
practical advantages and leverage over the Soviet Union. 
Cuba started developing its military presence in Africa in the early years of 
decolonization, through which the Cubans engaged in different types of missions and 
established special ties with a variety of African countries.207 It operated a guerrilla training 
base in Ghana from 1961 to 1966, engaged combat troops in Algeria’s border conflict with 
Morocco in 1963-65, operated an advisory military mission to help crush an army revolt in 
Congo-Brazzaville during 1965-66, and established “new military missions in Sierra Leone in 
                                                 
205 Gonzalez, 154. 
206 Ibid., 157-164. 
207 Ibid., 148. 
  34 
1972, Somalia in 1974, and Algeria in 1975.”208 In addition, Jorge Domínguez argues that 
through a professional and specialized training program, the Cuban armed forces improved 
their combat capabilities and developed “a large, competent and ready military reserve” in the 
early 1970s.209 These diversified missions allowed Cuban troops to gain a better 
understanding of the local politics, economy and society. 
Apart from a deeper understanding of the local power dynamic, Cuba also enjoyed more 
legitimacy in Africa than did the Soviet Union.210 Domínguez argues that Cuban foreign 
policy in Africa prioritized long-term objectives over short-term rewards.211 Instead of 
sending just weapons and money, the Cuban foreign aid program offered “a package of 
services,” including weaponry training and political education for troops, Cuban-headed 
construction projects, and Cuban-led hospitals.212 Another factor that contributed to the 
greater acceptance was Cuba’s identity. Gonzalez argues that certain characteristics 
associated with Cuba – its identity as “a small, revolutionary state in the Third World,” the 
historical and cultural linkage between its Afro-Cuban population and the African population, 
and its reputation as “a committed, selfless internationalist without big-power designs on the 
continent” – granted Cuba greater legitimacy to operate its political, technical, and military 
missions in the region.213 An anecdote to support this argument was President Sékou Touré of 
Guinea’s decision to expel the Soviet ambassador in 1961 and then invite the Cubans to set 
up a popular militia to be the guards of his regime in 1966.214 Apparently, the Cubans were 
more welcome in Africa than the Soviets were.  
As previously mentioned, Cuban support for the MPLA started before the eruption of the 
Angolan civil war, which then intensified after South Africa’s invasion. Close and frequent 
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interactions between the Cubans and the Angolans made Cuba influential in setting military 
strategies during the intervention.215 Gleijeses uses the example of “the three-year saga of 
Mavinga”, a town in southeastern Angola and a gateway to UNITA’s headquarter, to show 
Cuba’s role in the decision-making process.216 The Soviet military mission in Angola, headed 
by Colonel-General Konstantin Kurochkin, wanted to launch an attack to capture Mavinga in 
the spring of 1984.217 The Cubans, led by Jorge Risquet, Castro’s “point man in Africa,” and 
General Leopoldo (“Polo”), refused to cooperate because they thought the UNITA forces in 
central regions of Angola posed a greater threat.218 Kurochkin argued that the UNITA 
guerilla forces could be dealt with later and tried to convince the Cubans by citing the 
example of the Soviets still fighting the bandits in Central Asia for years after the 1917 civil 
war ended.219 This argument was refuted by Risquet, who pointed out that Angola was 
different from Central Asia and the central regions of Angola were vital for Angola’s 
economy, which meant defeating the guerrilla forces there was more important.220 He then 
added that the Soviets would not have waited so long “if the bandits had been between 
Moscow and Leningrad.”221 Since the Cubans were not persuaded, Kurochkin continued to 
put pressure on them by saying that the Soviet Defense Minister had approved the plan, 
which was once again rejected by Polo.222 This debate fully demonstrates Cuba’s better 
knowledge of the local economy. Apart from the influence on economy, Polo was also 
concerned about South Africa’s air superiority around Mavinga.223 When the Soviets failed to 
persuade the Cubans, they turned to the MPLA forces.224 The MPLA eventually agreed to 
attack Mavinga in 1985, and the outcome turned out exactly as Polo predicted: the MPLA 
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forces were “at the mercy of the enemy’s planes” due to Angola’s inadequate air-defense 
weapons.225   
To sum up, Cuba’s long-term military presence in Africa gave its military not only better 
local resources but also greater legitimacy. Compared to the Soviet Union, a superpower 
directly involved in the Cold War confrontation, Cuba, a Third World revolutionary country, 
was more likely to be accepted in Africa. These practical advantages and resources gave 
Cuba power to reject Soviet orders when their judgments did not align, for example, during 
the Mavinga saga. The Mavinga example shows that the Soviet Union needed Cuba’s support 
to launch an attack and the Soviets did not have full control over Cuba’s actions. The 
MPLA’s failure to capture Mavinga supports Taw’s argument that without thorough 
understanding of the local power dynamic, the external power’s plan could easily fail.  
Relative Will 
The second factor discussed in the theoretical model is about relative will and domestic 
political vulnerability. Arreguín-Toft and Mack argue that compared to external powers, local 
forces have stronger will to fight and suffer from fewer domestic political vulnerabilities. For 
the local forces, defeat in the internal conflict threatens their survival, which makes it easy 
and reasonable to justify the deployment of all resources and troops. The external powers, 
however, face no survival threat during the intervention, which makes it politically 
impossible and unnecessary to deploy all the resources. Besides, if the intervention did not 
turn out to be a quick victory, as the power disparity between external powers and local 
forces suggests, constituents of the external power would question the merits of intervention 
and demand a withdrawal.  
In the case of the Cuban-Soviet intervention in Angola, both countries were external 
powers, which means even if the intervention failed, neither state would face a threat to 
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survival. Nevertheless, the relative will argument still applies because Cuba had troops on the 
ground while the Soviet Union did not. As previously mentioned, the Cuban troops deployed 
to Angola accumulated to 38,000 by the spring of 1978.226 The Soviet Union, however, was 
unwilling to take the risk of sending in any military advisers or combat forces despite 
multiple requests from the MPLA. The fact that the Cubans had troops on the ground, which 
means higher stakes involved in Angola, was in and of itself a demonstration of a stronger 
resolve than that of the Soviet Union. The Soviet hesitancy to invest more in Angola was 
further demonstrated by its inconsistent support for the MPLA. Valenta argues that Moscow 
lost confidence in the MPLA in early 1974 when the group was struggling with a military 
defeat and a split group leadership.227 The Portuguese military, which was still fighting 
against the guerrilla forces before the April coup in Lisbon, almost defeated the MPLA and 
made it too weak to retaliate.228 Apart from the defeat on the military front, the MPLA 
leadership split into three fragments.229 Neto, the chairman of MPLA, headed one fragment 
while the other two were each headed by a vice chairman of MPLA.230 During this 
challenging time, Moscow stopped providing aid to Neto for six months and even started 
supporting Daniel Chipenda, one of the vice-chairmen, who was Neto’s main opponent.231 
The Soviet support for Neto did not resume until the late summer or early fall of 1974 when 
Neto regained control over the organization, the Soviets lost faith in Chipenda, and Chinese 
influence expanded in Angola.232 
Evidence discussed above suggests that compared to Cuba, Moscow had limited will to 
intervene in Angola. Though there is no consensus over exactly why the Soviet Union did not 
do more, scholars argue that both domestic and international considerations constrained 
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Soviet actions. Domestically, the Soviet Union’s policy in Africa was selective rather than 
expansionist.233 Internationally, the Soviet Union had to consider reactions from the U.S., 
China, and Western Europe, especially during détente.234 
Regarding the Soviet strategy toward Africa, there are criticisms against the assumption 
underlying the surrogate and the internationalist arguments that assume that Moscow was 
pursuing an expansionist and activist strategy in Africa. Instead, critics argue that the Soviet 
policy in Africa was selective and reactive.235 According to Richard Lowenthal, the Soviet 
Union focused on four regions in the Third World – North Africa, the Middle East, South and 
Central Asia – during the early 1970s.236 Alexei Kosygin, the Soviet Party spokesman in 
1971, named a number of target countries for future “trade and economic cooperation,” 
including India, Afghanistan, Iran and Algeria, in his five-year plan speech on the 24th Party 
Congress.237 What was noteworthy was the fact that these countries were targeted “not 
because they had chosen a non-capitalist path of development” – as the internationalist 
argument assumes – but because of their geographic and strategic characteristics, as well as 
their potential to contribute to “an international division of labor.”238 Furthermore, Kosygin 
points out a shift of focus from using economic aid to project influence to establishing 
stronger economic and trade ties between the Soviet Union and the Third World countries to 
secure more concrete and tangible economic benefits.239 As demonstrated by the speech, 
southern Africa was not a high priority for the Soviet Union in the early 1970s, which 
explains Moscow’s lack of enthusiasm about the intervention in Angola.240  
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If southern Africa was only of peripheral importance to the Soviet Union, it would be 
reasonable for Moscow to pursue a “selective engagement rather than expansion” policy in 
Africa.241 The Soviet Union’s willingness to intervene was also further reduced by several 
cases of unsuccessful transition to socialism in the 1960s.242 President Ahmed Ben Bella of 
Algeria, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, and Modibo Keita of Mali were representatives of the 
“revolutionary democratic regimes,” which were all recipients of the Lenin Peace Prize and 
promising candidates for socialist transition.243 However, all three regimes were highly 
unstable and soon replaced by more conservative power after the transition.244 Moreover, 
after the pro-Soviet governments in Sudan and Egypt deviated and joined the U.S. bloc, the 
Soviets became “more realistic if not pessimistic” and assumed that even if an African regime 
had a clear “socialist orientation,” it would be hard to escape from the Western economic 
system.245 Driven by these concerns, the Soviet Union only selectively engaged in a handful 
of African countries that were either of great economic and political value, such as Nigeria, 
or at a strategically important locations, including Somalia, Algeria, and Tunisia.246  
Internationally, the Soviet resolve and actions were contingent upon the U.S., China, and 
South Africa’s activities in Angola and constrained by détente against the United States.247 
The evidence used to support the surrogate argument – the Soviet intervention in Angola was 
a part of the predetermined plan to deny other powers’ access to southern Africa – can also be 
perceived from another perspective. The Soviet policy was actually reactive and opportunistic 
in the sense that it did not step up the aid until the U.S. increased its support and China 
started to gain momentum in Angola.248  
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After the Cuban and MPLA forces successfully forced their enemies to retreat to their 
original positions, the Soviet Union became more optimistic about Angola.249 However, its 
resolve and actions to intervene were constrained by détente.250 The Soviet Union did not 
suffer from much domestic political vulnerability because authoritarian regimes gave 
constituents little power to affect the country’s policies.251 However, there were still debates 
within the Soviet government. Valenta argues that even though the hardliners in Moscow, 
who advocated for a more activist strategy in Angola, won the debate in 1975, concerns over 
intervention endangering détente continued to be voice by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and the Ministry of Defense.252 The Cubans also assumed that the Soviets would be 
constrained by détente and adjusted their strategies accordingly.253 For instance, during the 
battle of Cuito Cuanavale in 1987, Castro ordered the deployment of Cuba’s best units of 
army and the most advanced weapons to Angola without consulting the Soviet Union.254 
Castro said that “Gorbachev’s mind was entirely focused on (the forthcoming summit in) 
Washington” and assumed that the Soviet Union would not do anything in Angola, which 
might increase the tension and sabotage the meeting.255 What was more interesting was 
Castro’s decision to inform the Soviet Union eight days after his deployment, which forced 
Moscow to accept the fait accompli.256 The Soviet Defense Minister Dmitrii Yazov was 
furious at the news and said: “In any case, we don’t want to do anything that the Americans 
can use against the Soviet Union and Cuba.”257 This line of speech clearly shows the Soviet’s 
mindfulness about détente and their constrained behaviors.  
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To sum up, whether the Soviet Union pursued an expansionist or selective strategy in 
Africa remains debatable. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge the evidence – the 
Soviets’ inconsistent aid for the MPLA, the five-year plan emphasizing regions other than 
southern Africa, and the unsuccessful socialist transitions in Africa before Angola – that 
supports the selective engagement interpretation. If the Soviet Union adopted a selective 
engagement policy, it would therefore have limited resolve to intervene in Angola. The 
Soviets’ constrained will and actions could be an opportunity for Cuba to exploit the 
uncertainties in Soviet policies and to use the resources to serve its own interests. Even if 
Moscow wanted to engage more in Angola in the 1970s, its resolve and actions were 
constrained by détente. The Soviet mindfulness of U.S. reactions became a significant 
political vulnerability, which made it possible for Castro to force a fait accompli upon the 
Soviet leadership.   
Diverging Objectives 
The third factor in the theory model uses the principal-agent framework to argue that the 
principals (external powers) must give up some control over their objectives and the actions 
of achieving these objectives when they delegate the conflict to the agents (local forces). 
Meanwhile, local forces also face trade-offs between resources and autonomy. In order to 
receive external support, local forces have to sacrifice autonomy over their actions and to 
prioritize the agenda of their sponsors. Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham argue that the 
trade-off between resources and autonomy on both sides can lead to potential agency slack, 
which is more likely to occur when the objectives and preferences between the principal and 
the agent significantly misalign. While applying this argument to the relationship between the 
Soviet Union and Cuba, we notice that although there was no significant misalignment in 
objectives, the Soviets and the Cubans still had different priorities in Angola. Evidence shows 
that the misalignment of objectives created incentives for Cuba to exploit the intervention to 
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increase leverage against the Soviet Union, prioritize its own national interests, enhance its 
status in the Third World, and even influence the Soviet policy in Africa.258  
One of the main misalignments between the Soviet Union and Cuba was about their 
objectives and perceptions of Africa.259 As discussed in the surrogate argument section, if the 
Soviet Union were pursuing an expansionist strategy and implementing a carefully thought-
out grand design in Africa, Cuba would be valued as a useful instrument. However, if we 
follow the interpretation that the Soviet Union adopted a selective and reactive strategy in 
Africa, which means southern Africa was only of peripheral importance and the Soviets were 
interested in only a handful of African countries, Cuba’s value would be significantly 
discounted.260 Gonzalez argues that this interpretation would lead to an unfavorable setting 
for Cuba due to mainly three reasons. First, the practical advantage that Cuba enjoyed as a 
result of its long-term presence in Africa would diminish, which would reduce its leverage 
against the Soviet Union and devalue itself to nothing more than “a surrogate operating at the 
discretion of its patron.”261 Second, if the Soviet Union decided to only intervene in a small 
number of African countries that were either of great intrinsic strategic value or targets of the 
Soviet opponents’ power projection, for example, China and the U.S., Cuba would have 
fewer chances to proceed with its revolutionary mission in Africa.262 Third, given Africa’s 
low priority in the Soviet strategic overview, it would be unlikely for the Soviet leadership to 
provide generous support for Cuba to intervene in Africa.263 Besides, even if Cuba were able 
to accomplish “successful ventures in Africa,” it would only bring insubstantial and 
temporary political influence for the Soviet Union.264 The Cubans would therefore find it 
difficult to transform their efforts and achievements in Africa into power and leverage against 
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the Soviets.265 Driven by these three concerns, Cuba would have strong incentives to help the 
Soviet Union gain momentum in the region and persuade the Soviets to prioritize Africa, 
whereby Cuba could demonstrate its value.266  
Cuba’s active and consistent intervention in Angola convinced the Soviets to change 
their attitude from passive tolerance to cautious engagement and eventually to active 
support.267 The outcome of the Angola intervention – a left-leaning government in Luanda – 
turned out to be very satisfying for Moscow.268 Apart from the success in Angola, Cuba also 
facilitated and encouraged Soviet intervention in Zimbabwe and Ethiopia.269 With the support 
from the Cuban military and political advisers, the Soviet Union intervened in the liberation 
movement in Zimbabwe through providing “military aid to guerrilla forces based in 
Mozambique and Zambia,” which had previously relied heavily upon China’s support.270 
Moreover, Cuba also assisted the Soviet intervention in Ethiopia by sending combat troops to 
defend the regime from the Somali invasion and the Eritrean secession.271 The Cuban military 
presence in Ethiopia amounted to “16,000 or more military personnel” by the spring of 1978, 
through which the Soviet Union secured its influence and status on the Horn of Africa even 
after giving up its alliance with Somalia.272 Gonzalez points out that these joint Cuban-Soviet 
developments in Africa created “a political momentum and a military dimension that did not 
exist prior to Angola.”273 These developments effectively demonstrated Cuba’s value, which 
was essential for Cuba to transform “passive leverage,” meaning Moscow chose to engage 
Havana after 1960 due to increasing stakes involved in Cuba, to “active leverage,” meaning 
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Moscow had no choice but to increase support for Cuba due to its growing reliance on Cuba 
while intervening in Africa.274  
Cuba’s increased active leverage against the Soviet Union was evident from three 
aspects, which also shows that Cuba was acting like an international paladin, through which it 
effectively manipulated the “Soviet Union’s big power interests and its military and 
economic resources” to forward its own national interests.275 First, Cuba obtained more and 
higher quality material support from the Soviet Union, including better economic and trade 
deals, and more importantly, “both symbolic and tangible rewards” for the Cuban 
Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR).276 The FAR developed a more comprehensive naming 
system at the end of 1976, which created more ranks for officers, and consequently, more 
long-term career opportunities.277 Generals who made special contribution in Angola were 
also promoted to new positions to recognize their achievements.278 Apart from these 
symbolic rewards, the Soviets equipped the FAR with a range of more sophisticated weapons, 
including T-62 tanks, ZSU 23-4 self-propelled anti-aircraft guns and MIG-23F aircrafts, after 
the intervention in Angola.279 This equipment, together with the victories in Angola and 
Ethiopia, significantly enhanced the competence and international status of the FAR.280 What 
was more important and noteworthy was the fact that the Soviets provided these weapons at 
the risk of jeopardizing the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) treaty.281 According to 
Robbins, although the U.S. generally believed that the MIG-23F aircrafts were not designed 
to deliver nuclear warheads, several Congress members still accused the shipment of directly 
violating “the 1962 U.S.-Soviet agreement prohibiting the deployment of offensive weapons 
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in Cuba” and intended to use it as an excuse to impede the passage of SALT.282 The Soviet 
Union’s willingness to take the risk of potentially harming its national interests was an 
unprecedented attempt to “strengthen ties with Cuba.”283 From Cuba’s perspective, we could 
argue that it proved a successful manipulation.   
The second aspect is about Cuba’s increased independence in its relationship with the 
Soviet Union and higher status in the Third World.284 Cuba’s greater degree of independence 
is demonstrated by the divergences between the Soviet Union and Cuba on several occasions, 
such as the coup against Neto in 1977 and the decision of sending troops to Cuito Cuanavale 
in 1987 without informing Moscow.285 The Castro regime’s heightened international status 
can be seen from Castro’s “month-long triumphal tour” in Africa in the spring of 1977 and 
another trip to North Africa a year later.286 Castro also hosted meetings with several African 
leaders, started teaching and training programs in Angola, and launched more aid missions in 
the region.287 In addition, Cuba was “unanimously and publicly commended” for its 
achievement in Angola during the Fifth Conference of the Nonaligned Nations in Sri 
Lanka.288 This was a recover of prestige for the Castro regime because Cuba was almost 
kicked out of the conference three years ago.289  
Apart from better material support and higher international status, Cuba also managed to 
exert direct and indirect influence on the Soviet Union regarding its policy in Africa.290 
Gonzalez distinguishes between direct and indirect influence by arguing that direct influence 
was a result of the Cuban leadership’s active attempts to shape the Soviet strategy while 
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indirect influence “depended on the Soviet assessments” of Cuba’s presence in Africa.291 
According to Gonzalez, Cuba exerted direct influence on the Soviet Union through mainly 
two channels: political interactions and military connections.292 Among the Cuban elites, 
Fidel Castro, his brother Raúl Castro and some military generals were the strongest advocates 
for high level of Cuban-Soviet intervention in Africa.293 Meanwhile, they also had the 
greatest access to the Soviet leadership during the 1960s and 1970s.294 Fidel Castro’s 
internationalist rhetoric, which emphasized Cuba’s mission and obligations in Africa, and his 
role as “an effective broker between the socialist camp and Africa” created incentives for the 
Soviet Union to at least maintain if not strengthen the relationship with Cuba, in order to 
show the Soviet commitments to the Third World.295 When Fidel Castro visited the Soviet 
Union after his African tour in the spring of 1977, he was greeted by multiple Soviet leaders 
in the airport, including Leonid Brezhnev, the then-General Secretary of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).296 With the access to the Soviet leadership and the 
personal contact between the two leaders, Cuba could easily engage in lobbying activities 
during meetings to shape the Soviet perceptions of Africa.297 Moreover, Gonzalez argues that 
although political interactions were effective, the most influential method was through 
military connections.298 The contact between the Cuban and Soviet militaries started in 1960, 
five years before the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) officially existed.299 Through arms 
shipment and training camps, the Soviet and Cuban militaries developed deep bonds, which 
became “the most important institutional linkage” between the two countries in the 1960s.300 
Such bonding was strengthened during the 1970s, when the FAR became more professional 
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and competent after victories in Angola and several other African countries.301 Additionally, 
meetings and exchanges between the two militaries were frequent and productive, for 
example, Raúl Castro, the head of the Cuban military, “routinely met with his Soviet 
counterpart” and the Soviets had military specialists stationed in Cuba “under the command 
of a Soviet general.”302 Given these close relationships, Cuba could effectively affect Soviet 
policies through the military.  
Different from the direct influence through political and military channels, Cuba’s 
indirect influence on the Soviets took a more passive form and was contingent upon the 
Soviet perceptions and judgments.303 Gonzalez argues that if Moscow had a positive 
perception of Cuba’s actions in Africa and saw them as beneficial for the Soviet Union, it 
would be willing to allow more Cuban direct influence on its policies.304 On the other hand, if 
the Soviets concluded with a negative assessment, Cuba would only have a limited effect on 
the Soviet decision-making.305 If we judge based on Cuba’s performance in Angola and 
Ethiopia, it would be reasonable to assume that the Soviet Union was more likely to make a 
positive assessment about Cuba’s presence in Africa.  
Two major changes in the Soviet Union after the intervention in Angola support this 
assumption. First, Gonzalez uses Joan Urban’s arguments to describe the debate between 
“conservative sectarians” and “revolutionary sectarians” in the Soviet political system.306 
Urban argues that before the Cuban-Soviet interventions, the Soviet foreign policies were 
dominated by the conservative sectarians, who adopted “a highly orthodox and cautious 
approach to the revolutionary process abroad, particularly in Western Europe.”307 In other 
words, short-term issues, for example, détente, were prioritized over long-term, global 
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revolutionary missions.308 The revolutionary sectarians, however, stressed the importance of 
revolutions, promoted more expansionist foreign policies, and even subordinated détente to 
revolutionary missions.309 Although this group initially focused on the Soviet engagements in 
Western Europe, what happened in Africa during the mid-1970s served as strong evidence to 
support their policies.310 Gonzalez argues that the increasing momentum and support for the 
revolutionary sectarians during the 1970s could at least be partially, if not completely, 
attributed to the intervention in Angola.311 Apart from the shift in policy orientation from 
conservative to revolutionary, Gonzalez argue that the Soviet Union not only redeemed its 
self-esteem and international reputation, which were both low after the Soviet-backed Arab 
states were defeated by Israel in the Middle East, but also demonstrated its power and global 
reach through the victories in Africa.312  
The second major change can be seen from the Soviet Union’s changed perception of the 
future for socialist transition in Africa.313 According to Gonzalez, this change was due to both 
the Soviet “greater capabilities for global outreach” and the Cuban political and military 
presence in Africa, which stabilized the otherwise volatile and weak governments.314 The 
Soviet Union attributed the setbacks in Algeria, Ghana and Mali to the region’s 
underdevelopment, the lack of population support, and the weak leadership.315 The successful 
intervention in Angola demonstrated Cuba’s capabilities and convinced the Soviets of the 
value of the Cuban presence in removing these “existing structural impediments,” stabilizing 
the pro-Soviet regimes in the region, and making socialist transitions in southern Africa more 
manageable.316 Gonzalez points out that the Soviet Union not only recognized Cuba’s value 
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but also saw its potential of consolidating the pro-Soviet countries in Africa, just as the Red 
Army did in Eastern Europe after the Second World War.317 Cuba, therefore, effectively 
shaped the Soviet perceptions about the potential of Africa, moved Africa up on Moscow’s 
priority list, which, as previously mentioned, could be used to advance its own interests.318       
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Chapter 4: United States, the Kurds, and ISIS 
The ongoing Syrian civil war is currently among the most vicious and complicated 
warfare in the world. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) and 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Syrian war had killed 
511,000 people as of March 2018 and displaced 6.6 million internally and 5.6 million 
globally.319 Apart from the high death toll and the disastrous humanitarian crisis, the chaos 
created by the endless fighting among the regime, the rebels, the Kurds, and the jihadists has 
presented external state and non-state actors with opportunities for exploitation and 
manipulation.320 Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah chose to back the Bashar al-Assad regime while 
Turkey, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries pledged their 
support to the opposition force.321 While the conflict between the Assad regime and the rebels 
is already convoluted and violent enough, this is only one dimension of the war.322 The 
Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) managed to exploit the chaos and establish a branch in Syria, 
through which the organization expanded into the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS).323 
With ISIS taking control over more territories and gaining more momentum in the summer of 
2014, the U.S. felt compelled to directly intervene through launching an aerial campaign and 
supporting the Iraqi and Syrian Kurds, whose survival were threatened by ISIS attack, to fight 
against ISIS in the region.324 With the U.S. support, the Kurds were very effective in fighting 
ISIS: Ilham Ahmed, the Kurdish co-chair of the Syrian Democratic Council, announced the 
defeat of ISIS on March 21, 2019.325 Although the power disparity between the U.S. and the 
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Kurds should imply absolute U.S. control in this patronage relationship, this was not the case. 
The Kurds, though with only 190,000 Peshmerga fighters in 2014 and 20,000 People's 
Protection Units (YPG) fighters in 2016, the equivalent of one-tenth of the Iraqi GDP in 2013, 
and no arms industry, managed to gain leverage over the U.S. and successfully manipulated 
the U.S. support.326 To better understand the dynamic between the U.S. and the Kurds, it is 
useful to apply the three factors identified in the theory chapter to analyze this case.  
First, local forces were essential in defeating ISIS for both practical and political reasons. 
Practically, the U.S. had to rely on ground forces to hold territory and to acquire human 
intelligence.327 Politically, it was essential to create an alternative to ISIS for the local 
population.328 Facing the fragmented local forces in Syria and Iraq, the U.S. had few good 
options. In comparison, the Kurds were more homogeneous and well-organized, which later 
also proved to be more effective in defeating ISIS.329 Since the U.S. had to rely on the Kurds 
to provide ground troops, local resources, and human intelligence, the Kurds had leverage 
over the U.S. despite their power disadvantage in this relationship. Second, Mack and 
Arreguín-Toft’s argument about relative will and political vulnerability applies well to the 
U.S.-Kurds relationship. The Obama administration's failure to follow through with its 
request for Assad to step down in 2011 and its inaction on the “red-line” warning in 2012 
against the use of chemical weapons clearly demonstrated the U.S. lack of interest in Syria.330 
The U.S. will, with respect to intervention, was not only constrained by public opinion, which 
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was mostly against more military intervention, especially the deployment of ground troops, 
but also complicated by the U.S. alliance with Turkey, who strongly opposed U.S. support for 
the Syrian Kurds.331 The Kurds, however, faced an imminent threat to their survival from 
ISIS’s attack, which gave them much stronger resolve to fight and saved them from political 
vulnerabilities.332 Third, unlike the U.S., whose goals in the Middle East were constantly 
fluctuating, the Kurds had a very clear set of objectives and goals: to carve out territory and 
to achieve independence and autonomy.333 An independent and autonomous Kurdish state, 
however, would further complicate the situation in Syria, destabilize Iraq, and most 
importantly, threaten the interests of Turkey.334 Although these consequences were against 
the U.S. interests, the U.S. had no better choice but to continue supporting the Kurds to defeat 
ISIS, which was the only clear objective of this element of the U.S. intervention in Syria.335 
Ultimately, with the ISIS currently falling apart and the U.S. pulling out of Syria, the Kurds 
managed to walk away with material support from the U.S. to continue pursuing objectives 
against U.S. interests.336  
 
The Civil War: 2011-2014 
The conflicts in Syria started in 2011 as street protests.337 Inspired by the Arab Spring 
movement in Tunisia and Egypt, fifteen teenagers spray-painted anti-regime graffiti in Dera’a 
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in mid-March 2011.338 Unfortunately, they were captured, detained and tortured by the head 
of security of the province, who was also Bashar’s cousin.339 This event led to street protests 
in Dera’a, to which the regime responded with live fire and killed dozens of protestors within 
a week.340 If the movement in Tunis and Cairo initially had little ripple effect in Syria, Dera’a 
was the spark needed to provoke open defiance and revolution against the Assad regime.341 
Thousands of people in provincial cities and the Damascus suburbs went into the streets, 
protesting against injustice and repression.342 In fear of losing face and compromising his 
family’s influence, Bashar refused to punish his cousin or compensate the victims’ 
families.343 Instead, he deployed more lethal force to crush the protest.344 In order to justify 
the violent suppression and to protect the legitimacy of his regime, Bashar also constructed a 
victim narrative, through which the protestors were described as “terrorists and fanatics.”345 
According to William Harris, the street protests in Syria, though on an unprecedented 
scale, were merely the trigger for long-term ethnic, religious and social conflicts embedded in 
the society.346 Harris argues that two predispositions of Assad’s tyrannical rule made the 
uprising inevitable.347 First, in order to maintain “security and stability,” the Assad regime 
relied heavily upon its highly developed security machine, consisting of secret police, an 
extensive monitoring network, and torture chambers, to detect and prevent any signal of 
dissent.348 Harris describes the Assad regime as “a secular Arab nationalist tyranny,” which 
has ruled Syria under repressive Ba’athism for decades.349 Since its foundation in 1943, the 
Ba’ath Party adopted an “Arab nationalist and semi-socialist” ideology, developed 
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exceptional institutional strength, and cultivated deep reach within the military.350 These 
characteristics enabled the Ba’athists to not only trump other ideologies during the Cold War 
but also build an efficient security machine to cultivate a culture of absolutism.351 Specific 
measures adopted by the regime include banning all ideas associated with religious 
communities and forcing Arabization on ethnic minorities, especially the Kurds.352 This long-
term repression and abuse of the population created “fierce resentment, fear and loathing” 
toward the regime, which makes decompression unavoidable.353 Second, the Ba’athist rule 
naturally gave rise to strongmen politics – Saddam Hussein in Iraq in the late 1960s and 
Hafiz al-Assad in Syria in the 1970s – and nepotism.354 Although the Ba’ath Party advocated 
semi-socialism and nationalism, sectarian identity still played a substantial part in Syrian 
politics. Sunni Arabs constitute the majority of the Syrian population, yet the leadership has 
been dominated by the Alawite minority, or more specifically, the Assad family.355 Assad 
family members control almost all the important and lucrative positions in the government, 
which subordinates the party to family interests and turns the government into a family 
business.356 Over time, the obvious hypocrisy – denying political rights to ethnic groups other 
than the Alawites while concentrating all the power and wealth in the hands of the Alawites – 
significantly undermined the legitimacy of the regime.357 Additionally, Harris points out that 
the Syrian economy shifted from the crumbling Ba’athist socialism to an even more 
destabilizing crony capitalism during the mid-1990s, which further damaged the foundation 
of the regime.358 In general, the Syrian regime’s fearful and repressive security machine 
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forced the population to constantly live in fear.359 When the spillover effect of the regional 
uprising got triggered by a local spark, the implosion of the Syrian regime became 
inevitable.360  
In addition to creating deep-rooted conflicts with its population, the Assad regime also 
contributed to the survival and growth of ISIS. Harris argues that both Saddam and Bashar 
maneuvered the relationship between Sunni Islamism and secular Ba’athism to strengthen 
their grip of power.361 Saddam introduced Sunni Islamic studies into his government in the 
1990s to boost the regime’s legitimacy among the Sunni Arabs in Iraq.362 Bashar, on the 
other hand, directly facilitated jihadist recruitment among the Sunni Arabs in Syria and 
channeled jihadists into Iraq in 2003 to distract the U.S. and to prevent an invasion.363  
According to Harris, these deliberate interactions were extremely poisonous because 
they helped ease the integration between Ba’athism and Sunni Islamism in jihadist 
organizations.364 After the military overthrew Saddam in 2003, the U.S. disbanded the Iraqi 
army, de-Ba’athified Sunni officials in the army, and backed Nouri al-Maliki, a Shi’a Prime 
Minister who started with a pragmatic approach of governance but succumbed to 
sectarianism after the U.S. left.365 Maliki’s open sectarianism favored the Shi’a and 
suppressed the Sunni, which provoked widespread anger and dissent among the disbanded, 
rebellious yet well-trained de-Ba’athified Sunni military personnel.366 Harris argues that these 
former military personnel became the perfect recruits for ISI and Saddam’s previous efforts 
in connecting Ba’athism with Sunni Islamism served as a bridge for the integration of 
Ba’athist military expertise with jihadism.367 When ISI reinvigorated and reorganized in 2010, 
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its new military was composed of highly experienced Ba’athist officers and the organization 
transformed into a hybrid of jihadism and Ba’athism.368  
In Syria, Bashar tasked his intelligence agencies to breed and channel Sunni jihadists 
into Iraq in 2003 to distract the U.S. so that Syria would not become the next target for U.S. 
invasion.369 This strategy not only directed the focus of domestic jihadism abroad but also 
allowed the regime to accumulate jihadist-related resources and intelligence, such as jihadist 
prisoners, information about the identity and salary of ISIS-affiliated state employees, and 
connections with the Iraqi Ba’athist network that cooperated with the Islamic State.370 These 
resources later became valuable leverage for the regime to trade information, manipulate 
narratives, and maneuver the development of jihadism during the first stage of the civil 
war.371 In sum, the infusion of Ba’athism with Sunni Islamism helped preserve the network 
for ISI, provided recruits for the organization, and facilitated ISI’s expansion into Syria in 
2013.372  
The street protests turned into war in July-August 2011, during which the regime 
deployed more well-equipped forces to crush the demonstration.373 In response, some army 
officers defected and created the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in late July, which was mainly 
composed of Sunni Arabs.374 Although the FSA initially rejected sectarianism or Islamism, 
such an effort was hard to maintain due to the difficulties of organizing scattered armed 
forces and countering the rise of religious militancy.375 With a large number of armed groups 
attaching themselves to the band of FSA, the FSA was unable to effectively provide any 
logistical support or a clear chain of command.376 On the battlefield, the FSA managed to 
                                                 
368 Ibid. 
369 Ibid., 25. 
370 Ibid., 26. 
371 Ibid. 
372 Ibid., 20. 




  57 
seize the Sunni suburb of Baba Amr in Homs in November 2011, but was forced to withdraw 
in March 2012.377 The battle of Baba Amr, during which the regime used heavy artillery to 
blockade and destroy the city in order to crush the FSA’s resolve, exemplified the fighting 
between the regime and the rebels in most suburbs in Damascus and Aleppo.378 Joseph 
Holliday argues that the regime used disproportionate force to target both soldiers and 
civilians to increase the cost of fighting for the rebels.379 This was indeed the case in Baba 
Amr, where hundreds of civilians were killed by the regime bombardment.380 
At the initial stage of the war, external intervention was quite limited.381 Both Saudi 
Arabia and Turkey pledged themselves to the opposition force but did not send in any 
material support.382 Although both the U.S. and the European countries asked the Assad 
regime to “step aside,” neither the U.S. nor Europe took any action.383 The rebels had to rely 
on “captured regime stocks, defecting officers and soldiers, the black market, and smuggling” 
for their weaponry supply, which means their aggression could be easily neutralized by the 
better equipped regime force.384 Holliday points out that even though the rebels successfully 
occupied some territories in 2011, they were unable to protect and retain control due to the 
insufficiency in weapons and fighters.385  
The situation changed in 2012. The opposition forces launched attacks simultaneously in 
different locations, which stretched the regime force thin and made their attacks more 
manageable.386 Additionally, the conflict became increasingly sectarian, which attracted more 
“hardline Sunni Islamists and jihadists” to join the opposition and forced the regime to rely 
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more on the minorities, mostly the Alawites and Christians.387 The combination of effective 
strategy and weakened regime force enabled the rebels to achieve some success during the 
summer of 2012.388 Through occupying the eastern segment of Aleppo, the rebels’ presence 
effectively threatened the airport and the military-industrial facilities in the region.389 Their 
redoubts in Homs and al-Qusayr provided access to oversee the transportation between 
Damascus and the coast.390 Moreover, the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) 
joined the fight and occupied part of the northern territories in July, which also helped the 
rebels preserve their momentum through 2012.391  
Apart from troubles created by the rebels on the battlefield, the regime faced greater 
problems with its leadership.392 Bashar’s brother-in-law was killed in an explosion in 
Damascus and two Sunni high-ranking officers of the regime – General Manaf Talss and 
Prime Minister Riyad Hijab – fled to Turkey and Jordan.393 However, the Assad regime 
managed to survive this crisis due to the Alawites’ sustained loyalty, the regime’s advantages 
in air force and weaponry, the manipulation of narratives, and more importantly, the Iranian 
direct intervention.394 In early 2013, the regime imposed a blockade on the rebel-controlled 
sectors in Aleppo and Homs to starve the population, block transportation and interrupt 
communication, which effectively forced a stalemate in the region.395 In August, Assad 
ignored President Barack Obama’s “red line” warning and used sarin gas on the population in 
rebel-controlled areas of Damascus, which killed 1,400 people.396  
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While the pendulum seemed to be swinging toward the regime in 2013, the rebels were 
further challenged by their increasing fragmentation.397 Although the rebel forces’ 
geographically-scattered nature increased their redundancy, making them hard to annihilate, 
it also made coordination extremely difficult.398 Besides, an increasing number of fighters left 
to join the jihadists, which gave rise to a “turf warfare” within the opposition, and therefore, 
consumed fighters’ morale and further weakened the group’s cohesion.399 Although external 
support for the rebels from Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the West started at the end of 2012, this 
support was all somewhat distracted and constrained due to domestic political concerns.400  
Meanwhile, ISI, under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, re-emerged in Iraq in 
2010, got ready to launch a new branch in Syria in August 2011, transformed into ISIS in 
April 2013, and publicly announced the formation of the “caliphate” in June 2014.401 In late 
2013, ISIS started seizing the opposition’s territory.402 After conquering al-Raqqa in August, 
ISIS advanced westward to the Idlib countryside, then northward to al-Bab, and eventually 
occupied A’zaz, a city close to the Turkish border.403 Although the rebels later threw ISIS out 
of the northwestern part of Syria, they paid a high price, in terms of casualties and 
resources.404 ISIS also managed to survive the attack and successfully retreated to the east.405 
Parallel to the conflicts in Syria, ISIS and its affiliated Sunni tribes in Iraq were also fighting 
against the government and the Iraqi Kurds led by the Kurdistan Regional Government 
(KRG).406 By December 2014, ISIS had taken control over major cities in Iraq, including 
Fallujah, Mosul and Tikrit, and secured border crossings that connected Iraq and Syria.407 
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Despite the challenge of fighting on double front, ISIS demonstrated clear objectives and 
serious executing capabilities.408 According to Harris, the ISIS agenda in eastern Syria 
included three parts. First, the priority was to acquire a “well-buffered command center,” 
which pushed ISIS to take full control over al-Raqqa from Jabhat al-Nusra in January 
2014.409 Second, ISIS needed access to the Turkish border to receive material supplies and 
foreign recruits, which motivated ISIS to attack the Kurds in the north.410 Third, in order to 
guarantee the territorial integrity of its caliphate across Syria and Iraq, ISIS needed a channel 
that connected the two countries.411 The Deir al-Zor province, which borders Iraq and lays at 
the center of the joint war zone, consisting of Syria and Iraq, became the centerpiece of 
ISIS’s plan.412 Although ISIS only commanded 2-3,000 troops against the 10,000 rebels in 
Deir al-Zor, they had superior firepower, greater mobility and flexibility, better 
communication, and a more effective supply chain.413 These characteristics enabled ISIS to 
not only win over the entire Deir al-Zor province in early June 2014, but also take control 
over one third of the combined territory of the two countries during the summer of 2014.414 It 
only took ISIS less than a month to seize this big chunk of territory, which further boosted 
their confidence in fighting the rebels, the regime and the Kurds.415 The battle in Deir al-Zor 
between ISIS and the rebels, according to Harris, transformed the nature of the war, adding a 
second focus, which centered around ISIS, to the conflict.416 With ISIS taking control over 
too many territories and gaining excessive momentum in Syria, the U.S. felt compelled to 
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intervene to contain the threat and to combat terrorism.417 In September 2014, the U.S. 
directly intervened in Syria through an aerial campaign against ISIS.418  
 
The United States and the Kurds in defeating ISIS 
By the time the U.S. directly intervened in Syria in late 2014, ISIS had control over one 
third of the combined territory of Syria and Iraq, had access to oilfields, and enjoyed high 
momentum of recruiting more fighters and acquiring more territories.419 Facing ISIS’s 
expansion, the Obama administration decided to “leverage a relatively small footprint of U.S. 
and coalition forces,” which means to intervene through launching an aerial campaign and 
deploying only a limited number of Special Operations Forces, instead of a large number of 
ground troops, to fight ISIS.420 The U.S.-led coalition consisted of France, Britain, Australia, 
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain.421  
According to Ash Carter, Secretary of Defense from 2015 to 2017, the U.S. resisted 
sending ground troops due to mainly two reasons.422 First, a U.S. intervention with a large 
number of ground troops could be perceived as an invasion, which would not be supported by 
the international society, and therefore, make a coalition impossible.423 Second, an aerial 
campaign could maximize the U.S. advantages in technology, firepower, and logistics 
whereas ground troops might be pulled into “ISIS’s turf.”424 In addition to these two concerns, 
two other factors that Carter did not make explicit were Obama’s reluctance to intervene and 
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the public opinion against more military interventions, especially those that deploy a large 
number of ground troops yet have ambiguous objectives and unclear benefits.425  
Practical Advantage 
Although the U.S. aerial campaign weakened ISIS in all aspects, including manpower, 
firepower, and mobility, it was not enough to defeat it.426 The U.S. still needed ground forces 
for both practical and political reasons. Practically, ground forces served three main purposes 
in fighting ISIS. First, it was essential to have forces on the ground to hold territories 
reclaimed from ISIS.427 Carter describes this strategy as “the lasting defeat of ISIS.”428 This 
strategy was especially important because unlike Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda, which made no 
territorial commitment, or Jabhat al-Nusra, which advocated for “jihadism in one country,” 
ISIS had a vision for a cross-country caliphate, which should be, according to ISIS, “the only 
legitimate authority on the planet.”429 According to Audrey Cronin, ISIS was not a terrorist 
group but “a pseudo-state led by a conventional army,” in possession of territory, 
infrastructure, well-developed military capabilities, and independent funding sources.430 In 
order to protect its legitimacy and maintain its attractiveness to new recruits, ISIS had to keep 
conquering territories and fighting for resources.431 Without ground troops, recovered 
territories would be left unguarded, which gave ISIS chance to take them back. Second, 
although the U.S. air force is unrivaled, it is no substitute for ground forces in acquiring 
human intelligence.432 ISIS’s leaders and fighters hid in cities so that they could blend in with 
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civilians.433 This tactic made it hard to launch precise surgical strikes without incurring high 
casualties.434 Troops on the ground, who can provide intelligence about the locations of 
ISIS’s personnel and facilities, would be helpful in identifying targets and increasing the 
accuracy of the attack.435 Additionally, Carter argues that the U.S. intelligence on ISIS was so 
inadequate in 2014 that the Americans had little knowledge about the identity, location and 
plan of their jihadist enemies.436 The insufficiency in intelligence was only gradually 
overcome in the following combat, during which the U.S. Special Operation Forces and the 
local ground troops both made valuable contributions.437 The U.S. Special Forces launched a 
raid in May 2015 to capture Abu Sayyaf, one of ISIS’s leaders.438 Abu Sayyaf was killed, but 
his wife and slave, along with documents and electronics were captured, through which the 
U.S. obtained important information about ISIS’s leadership behavior.439 If the U.S. launched 
an airstrike against the target, it would not have been able to obtain that kind of crucial 
information about ISIS. Likewise, the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Force (SDF) was 
successful in seizing Manbij in August 2016.440 This operation entailed heavy casualties but 
enabled the SDF to capture former ISIS safe houses and facilities, which provided valuable 
intelligence for counter-terrorism efforts in Europe and the U.S.441 These two cases both 
demonstrate the importance of ground troops in acquiring human intelligence. Third, the U.S. 
needed ground forces, preferably local forces, to better understand the local power dynamic. 
Air bombing could effectively hit the target but would not help the U.S. gain insights into the 
ongoing conflict in the war zone.442 Philip Zelikow argues that supporting and training local 
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forces is helpful because learning goes both ways.443 Interactions with local forces would fill 
in gaps in the U.S. understanding, inform the U.S. strategies and tactics, and allow the U.S. to 
intervene with higher credibility.444  
In addition to the practical advantages, ground forces also served political purposes. 
Cronin argues that ISIS differs from al-Qaeda in many aspects, including recruiting 
strategies.445 Different from Al-Qaeda’s focus on religion, ISIS appeals to people’s desire for 
“adventure, personal power, a sense of self and community” or, sometimes simply, violence 
and cruelty.446 ISIS’s strategy takes advantage of the young population’s need for agency and 
the older generation’s desire for money and power.447 After joining ISIS, new recruits are 
immediately given the chance to fight and even sexual partners to entertain them.448 In order 
to prevent ISIS from expanding into new territories or reinvigorating in recovered territories, 
the U.S. had to create an alternative that could provide the local population with agency and a 
sense of belonging. As mentioned in the theory chapter, local forces have much higher 
legitimacy than external powers in the local sphere. This argument is supported by Howard 
Clark, who points out that it is important to have citizens fighting for their own land “with 
their own blood and sweat,” especially in Arab countries that involve deep-rooted tribal 
affiliations and sectarian divisions.449 Clark further emphasizes that political legitimacy and 
trust for local authorities are so fragile and specific that they could not easily shift to “far-
away capitals,” not to mention to ground troops of external powers.450 Clark uses the battle of 
Mosul to demonstrate his point. He argues that unless the Sunni Arabs in the city decided to 
rise and fight, Mosul would always be unstable and on the verge of falling to ISIS again.451 
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Moreover, the tactic of completely relying on an aerial campaign without troops fighting 
terrorism on the ground had the risk of being manipulated by ISIS.452 The U.S. attack against 
jihadists can be twisted and described as an attack against all Muslims, which could easily 
radicalize the population and invoke an urge to seek revenge.453 As a result, the U.S. had to 
rely on local forces to provide the local population with agency, legitimacy and organization 
to prevent ISIS from coming back.  
To sum up, ground forces were essential in the war against ISIS. From a practical 
perspective, the U.S. needed ground forces to hold territories, to obtain human intelligence 
and to better understand the local power dynamic. Even though the Special Forces were also 
effective in collecting intelligence, they were unable to hold territories and have fewer 
knowledge about the local society than the local forces do. Given the fact that the Obama 
administration was unwilling to deploy a large number of ground troops in Syria, supporting 
local forces was the most ideal option. More importantly, the U.S. had to rely on local forces 
for political reasons. To eliminate ISIS and prevent it from coming back, the U.S. needed 
local forces to serve as an alternative to ISIS for the local population. This is especially 
important in Syria and Iraq, where tribal, sectarian and religious identities and relationships 
are so complicated and intertwined, making local authorities essential. As a result of their 
practical advantages in local presence, intelligence, and legitimacy, local forces became 
necessary and desirable in the war against ISIS. The U.S.’s reliance on them, in turn, gave 
these local forces leverage over the U.S., despite an overall power disadvantage.  
Local forces were necessary, but the many actors in Syria and Iraq meant that the U.S. 
had to choose from different local partners. Despite the presence of rebels, the regime, Iran, 
Russia, the Iraqi army, and the Kurds, however, the U.S. had few good options. First, the 
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rebels were extremely fragmented and disorganized.454 In general, the attention of the rebels 
was mostly on the Assad regime.455 Thus, even though they managed to form a loose 
alignment among three groups to fight ISIS in November 2013 – the Islamic Front, the Syrian 
Revolutionaries’ Front (SRF), and a smaller group consisting of ex-FSA fighters – that jointly 
commanded 80,000 fighters across Syria, no central authority or coordination mechanism 
existed to bring all the fighters to the battlefield to fight alongside each other.456 According to 
Carter, the U.S. plan for Syria in 2014 was to recruit and train individual rebel fighters, who 
would then assemble into a new force.457 This plan apparently failed because it was too costly 
and time-consuming.458 Sadly, after pouring millions of dollars into recruiting and training 
fighters in Syria, the U.S. only had around “60 dependable anti-ISIS fighters” deployed in 
Syria in July 2015.459 Some rebel trainees even gave U.S. weapons to Jabhat al-Nusra in 
order to get safe passage through the terrorist-controlled areas in September 2015.460 Besides, 
the rebels also had a terrible human rights record: they killed 190 Alawites in a massacre in 
September 2013, among which 57 were women and 18 were children.461 To sum up, the 
rebels’ fragmentation, focus on fighting Assad, connection with terrorist groups, and 
atrocious human rights record discouraged the U.S. from providing support for them to fight 
ISIS.  
Second, supporting the Assad regime was not feasible. The regime forces and ISIS 
stayed out of each other’s way before the summer of 2014.462 More importantly, it would be 
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impossible for the U.S. to support a regime that had used poison gas on its citizens.463 Third, 
Iran and Russia mostly used ISIS as a cover to justify their intervention in Syria.464 Iran sent 
Quds Force advisers and weapons to support the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq 
to fight ISIS.465 Iran’s priority, however, was to strengthen the power of Shi’a Arabs and 
promote Shi’a dominance in Iraq.466 During battles against ISIS in Iraq when both the Iran-
backed Shi’a militias and the U.S. were involved, the Shi’a forces wanted independent 
victories, rejected U.S. involvement, and even threatened to fight the Americans.467 The idea 
of coordinating with Iran would not be supported by the U.S. Congress or the American 
public, either. In terms of Russia, although the Russians frequently expressed their intention 
to fight ISIS, such gesture was merely a cover for their true intention, which was to help 
Assad win the war so that Syria would be their “remaining foothold in the Middle East.”468 
Russia deployed “500 Russian marines and ‘dozen’ of combat airplanes and attack 
helicopters” to Syria in September 2015 for the purpose of counter-terrorism.469 In reality, 
however, all these personnel and weapons were used to attack the rebels and “not a single 
bomb fell on the ISIS caliphate.”470 Fourth, the U.S. tried to rebuild and re-equip the Iraqi 
army as an indigenous force to fight ISIS.471 While planning to retake Mosul in February 
2015, the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Lloyd Austin intended 
to rely on the Iraqi army, which, according to Carter, barely existed on paper.472 The fact that 
it would take too long for the Iraqi army to be ready to fight made them not ideal for 
cooperation.  
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Compared to the four local presence discussed above, the Iraqi and Syrian Kurds had 
three main characteristics that made them a useful ally on the ground for the U.S.-led 
coalition in the war against ISIS. First, the Kurds were relatively homogeneous, well-
organized and militarily capable.473 Although the Kurds had and still have internal divisions, 
the existential threat posed by ISIS brought the Iraqi Kurds and the Syrian Kurds together.474 
The Iraqi Kurds have been governed by the KRG and guarded by the Peshmerga, while the 
Syrian Kurds have been ruled by the PYD and protected by the YPG.475 The YPG, upon the 
U.S. request, adopted a new name – the Syrian Democratic Force (SDF) – in July 2017.476 
Both the Peshmerga and the YPG had been established militaries before ISIS attacked the 
Kurds, which saved the U.S. from having to build an army from scratch and allowed the U.S. 
military support to be “plugged into the already-existing groups.”477 The Crisis Group Middle 
East Report in May 2015 quoted a European diplomat, who said that the coalition chose to 
support the Iraqi Kurds mainly because of the Peshmerga, which was perceived as “a well-
organized counterpart” to the U.S.-led coalition’s military.478 Second, the narrative that the 
U.S. was supporting and protecting a minority group under existential threat in the Middle 
East sold well in the government and among the public.479 Masoud Barzani, the president of 
KRG, also sent compelling message to persuade the West to support the Kurds in fighting 
against ISIS. Barzani told the Washington Post that ISIS not only posed a threat to the Middle 
East but also to the entire world.480 More importantly, he emphasized that the Kurds cannot 
fight ISIS alone and invited the U.S. to support the Kurds, a group of force that was “the 
United States’ staunch allies in the region … the only force in the area with the means and 
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will to protect thousands of lives from the horrors that these terrorists bring.”481 Third, the 
U.S. had a long-term and well-established relationship with KRG and Peshmerga before the 
war started.482 Peshmerga had facilitated U.S. intelligence gathering in the region and 
benefited from the U.S. military support since the U.S. invasion of Iraq.483 This relatively 
long-standing alliance could at least reassure the U.S. that the KRG would “use weapons for 
the right purpose,” which made them a trustworthy partner.484 Different from the relationship 
between the U.S and the KRG, the U.S. support for the PYD was more recent.485 According 
to Harris, the U.S. saw the PYD as “an effective but insufficient ground force against ISIS” in 
2014.486 Despite its insufficiency at the beginning, YPG proved its capacity and acquired 
recognition during the Kobani battle in October 2015.487  
Given the importance of ground troops in fighting ISIS and the characteristics of other 
local forces in Syria and Iraq, the U.S. decided to support the Iraqi and the Syrian Kurds. The 
U.S. provided the Kurds with weapons, training and logistical support, while at the same time, 
relying on them to provide “logistical and operational collaboration” on the ground.488 The 
U.S. support empowered the Kurds, which created opportunities for them to acquire leverage, 
enhance status, and even manipulate the relationship with the U.S. As briefly mentioned 
above, the YPG made significant contributions to the success in the battle of Kobani. The 
victory changed the U.S. government’s perception of Kobani, reflected through John Kerry’s 
rhetoric, from not on the “level of strategic objective” to “a big deal.”489 This battle 
demonstrated the military capability of YPG, which was immediately promoted to “the head 
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of a new front of Arab and other non-Kurdish factions” in the following month.490 Another 
example that shows the Kurds manipulating U.S. support was during the Mosul battle in 
2016.491 While the U.S. was planning to retake Mosul, ISIS’s center in Iraq, the KRG and the 
Iraqi government were involved in an oil dispute.492 Oil was a crucial element for the KRG to 
gain sovereignty, but Baghdad was unwilling to compromise.493 The U.S. initially had no part 
in this dispute but needed logistical and operational support from the Peshmerga, which was 
in control of land surrounding Mosul, to defeat ISIS in Mosul.494 The KRG then effectively 
used its local presence as a leverage and made it explicit that it would not cooperate unless 
the oil dispute was settled in their favor.495 Eventually, the U.S. envoy Brett McGurk acted as 
a mediator for five months and achieved an agreement in the interests of the KRG in 
exchange for Peshmerga’s “full, enthusiastic collaboration in the Mosul battle.”496  
Relative Will  
In addition to the practical advantage as a result of their local presence, knowledge, and 
network, the Kurds also had stronger will to fight than the U.S. did in Syria. According to 
Mack and Arreguín-Toft, local forces tend to have stronger will to fight because they have 
higher stakes involved in the conflict and are constrained by fewer political vulnerabilities. 
For the external powers, whose survival and security are not under threat, they are more 
likely to face pressure from their political institutions and society, demanding a quick victory 
to justify the resources deployed for the intervention. If it is widely known that the external 
power’s will of intervention is constrained by domestic politics or public opinion, local forces 
would not expect a long-term relationship, and then have incentives to manipulate and exploit 
                                                 
490 Ibid. 
491 Ibid., 113-114. 
492 Ibid., 113. 
493 Ibid. 
494 Ibid. 
495 Ibid., 114. 
496 Ibid. 
  71 
external support to pursue their own objectives. This argument is well-supported by the 
relationship between the Kurds and the U.S. in fighting ISIS.  
ISIS targeted the Kurds for mainly two reasons. First, the Kurds prioritized ethnic 
identity over religious identity.497 The PYD’s campaign for “secularism, socialism, and 
gender equality” was perceived by ISIS as being godless.498 Second, the Syrian Kurds 
occupied territories in northern Syria, which blocked ISIS communication with its cells in 
Turkey and Europe and obstructed transportation of foreign recruits from Turkey into 
Syria.499 The Kurd-controlled Kobani was especially important because it was in the middle 
of Aleppo – ISIS was in charge of “the Syrian side of the Turkish border northeast of Aleppo” 
in 2014 – and al-Raqqa, ISIS’s headquarter.500 According to Harris, ISIS wanted to acquire as 
much control over the Syrian-Turkish border as possible so that it could penetrate Turkey, 
which had mostly been focusing on the PYD’s presence on the border.501 Unlike the Syrian 
Kurds, the Iraqi Kurds were not “an immediate target” for ISIS in 2014 because they did not 
hold territories that stood in ISIS’s way.502 However, their territories and resources in 
northern Iraq still made an ISIS attack inevitable.503  
Both the Iraqi and the Syrian Kurds faced existential threat from ISIS’s attack in 2014.504 
ISIS surrounded villages around Sinjar, a Yazidi town west of Mosul, on August 3, 2014.505 
The Peshmerga militia stationed in the region was no match for ISIS, which was equipped 
with American weapons captured from the Iraqi army.506 Besides, ISIS was so well informed 
that it had precise information about the identity and location of the Sunnis, Christians and 
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Yazidis in the village, which allowed it to plan accordingly.507 While facing this strong 
enemy and its efficient attack, the Peshmerga lost confidence, disassembled, and left the 
50,000 people in the Sinjar Mountain on their own.508 Four days after capturing Sinjar, ISIS 
seized the Mosul dam – the largest dam in Iraq – and started advancing toward Erbil.509 In 
order to save the KRG from this crisis, the U.S. intervened through aerial campaign, which 
enabled the Peshmerga to hold Erbil, recover the Mosul dam, and evacuate the population in 
the mountains.510 In Syria, although the YPG managed to resist ISIS in July 2014, it was still 
not strong enough to fend off the ISIS’s major attack against the Kobani canton in mid-
September.511 The YPG held only “a pocket in Kobani town” by early October, which forced 
the majority of the population to flee across the border into Turkey.512 Despite Turkey’s 
opposition to the U.S. supporting the YPG, the U.S.-led coalition still intervened through air 
bombing to protect the Syrian Kurds.513 This support allowed the YPG to win the battle in 
January 2015 and regain all the lost territory in the canton by mid-March.514 
Unlike the Kurds, the U.S. faced no existential threat in the civil war of Syria. Although 
ISIS was a formidable enemy that threatened the U.S. national interests, it posed no threat to 
U.S. survival. Given the power disparity between the U.S. and ISIS, it would be unreasonable 
and politically impossible for the U.S. to deploy all of its resources, as the Kurds would, to 
fight ISIS. Besides, the U.S. was much more domestically-politically vulnerable than the 
Kurds, which significantly constrained its will. According to the survey conducted by the 
Pew Research Center in 2012, 64% of the U.S. population did not support intervention in 
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Syria, 62% opposed airstrikes and 63% were against the idea of supporting the rebels.515 
Another survey conducted in September 2013 showed that 74% believed that airstrikes would 
“create a backlash against the U.S. and its allies in the region” and 61% expected long-term 
U.S. military commitment in Syria.516 In terms of public support for U.S. campaign against 
ISIS, the majority supported the campaign but only 30% believed that the U.S. had “a clear 
goal in taking military action.”517 In general, the U.S. public was not in favor of another 
military intervention in the Middle East, which could be an important factor that constrained 
the Obama administration’s will of intervention, especially during the initial stages of the 
civil war. 
The U.S. limited interests in Syria were well demonstrated and widely known after two 
empty threats from the Obama administration. First, the U.S. government asked Assad to 
“step aside” in 2011 but did not follow through with any actions.518 This behavior sent a clear 
message that the U.S. was no friend of Assad, but also signaled the U.S. limited interests in a 
direct intervention in Syria, which emboldened the regime and the jihadists.519 Second, 
Obama explicitly declared that the use of chemical weapons was the “red line” that would 
trigger direct military intervention from the U.S.520 However, the U.S. government had no 
reaction when the Assad regime released a small amount of poison gas in mid-2013, which 
showed the U.S. unwillingness to intervene and encouraged Assad to release a large quantity 
of sarin gas in rebel-controlled areas of Damascus in August 2013.521 Once again, the Obama 
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administration did not actualize its threat of intervention, and Assad was let off the hook after 
chemical disarmament.522  
Although the U.S. threat of intervention did not directly affect the Kurds, they could not 
help but notice the U.S.’s small appetite for more intervention in the Middle East. This 
perception led the Kurds to doubt the U.S. long-term commitment to their cause after the war 
against ISIS ended, which likely motivated them to seize the moment and exploit U.S. 
support when they had the chance.523 For the Syrian Kurds, their alliance with the U.S. was 
already shaky while they were still fighting ISIS.524 Unlike the long-term and well-
established relationship between the U.S. and KRG, the U.S. alliance with PYD was more 
recent.525 As discussed above, the Syrian Kurds were the only meaningful ally on the ground 
that the U.S. had in Syria.526 With the U.S. support, the YPG fighters were very efficient in 
fighting ISIS.527 They effectively forced ISIS to withdraw from the north and fall back to al-
Raqqa and the Euphrates Banks in early 2017, defeated ISIS in al-Raqqa in October, reduced 
the number of ISIS fighters in Iraq and Syria to 1,000 by December 2017, attacked ISIS’s last 
foothold in eastern Syria in November 2018, and captured Baghouz, the last piece of territory 
held by ISIS, in March 2019.528 After recognizing the YPG’s capability and contribution, the 
U.S. stepped up its arms supply in May 2017.529 This support, however, was strongly 
opposed by Turkey, which saw the PYD as an offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
(PKK), a terrorist-separatist group that has been trying to gain independence and divide 
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Turkey since the 1980s.530 After the victory in al-Raqqa in October, the U.S. conceded to 
Turkey’s strong opposition and cut off the arms supply in November.531  
There were three Kurdish uprisings in Turkey during the 1920s and 30s.532 Though the 
Turkish government managed to crush all three, the Kurds’ ambition of independence always 
kept Ankara on edge, and inevitably, gave rise to a range of repressive policies, including 
banning all Kurdish organizations, closing down all Kurdish schools, and closely monitoring 
Kurdish activities across the border in Syria and Iraq.533 The fact that one of the three 
uprisings was planned by Khoybun, “the first transnational Kurdish political party,” and 
launched through their Syrian base explained Turkey’s concern about the PYD gaining more 
power in Syria.534 Besides, the PYD does have a close relationship with the terrorist group 
PKK.535 It was founded by the PKK in 2003 and the YPG militia was constructed in 2011-
2012 with support from PKK.536 After the establishment of the YPG, the PYD managed to 
consolidate power and marginalize the Kurdish National Council (KNC), which had been 
willing to trade the Syrian Kurds’ collaboration in fighting the regime for Turkey’s 
recognition of “Kurdish identity and grievances” before the PYD became more dominant.537  
Turkey had two major concerns after the Kurds joined the fight in Syria.538 First, Turkey 
was worried about the Syrian Kurds cooperating with the Assad regime.539 Hostilities 
between Syria and Turkey started to develop after Assad rejected Turkey’s suggestion of 
political reform and personally confronted the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan in 
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2011.540 With the street protests evolving into a civil war in 2011, Turkey started providing 
support for the rebels and the jihadists to fight for a regime change in Syria.541 This 
intervention marked the end of Turkey’s “zero-problems with neighbors” foreign policy in 
the region.542 In terms of the PYD and the regime, Turkey accused the PYD of acting as “a 
surrogate for the Assad regime and the PKK,” since the PYD not only shared al-Qamishli, a 
major border city, with the regime, but also was a member of the National Coordination 
Committee (NCC), an agency that was commonly known as the “regime tool.”543 Second, 
Turkey perceived the PYD’s contribution to the war against ISIS as a design by the PKK to 
demonstrate capability and power, which would strengthen the Kurdish population’s resolve 
to fight for independence.544 Even though the PYD leader Salih Muslim said during an 
interview in July 2015 that the Syrian Kurds had no intention to be independent, Turkey was 
still worried about the Kurds acquiring territorial continuity along the Syrian-Turkish border, 
which could not only lead to the Syrian Kurds’ independence but also unsettle the Kurdish 
population in Turkey.545   
 The bitter history between the Turks and the Kurds along with Turkey’s suspicion 
toward the rising PYD led to Turkey’s judgment about the PYD: it was as much of a threat as 
ISIS, if not more.546 The most ideal scenario then would be to have these two enemies wear 
each other out in Syria.547 As a result, Turkey refused to provide help when the Syrian Kurds 
faced an existential threat in 2014 and strongly opposed the U.S. support for the YPG as 
well.548 When the U.S.-backed YPG fought for survival in Kobani, a city on the Syrian-
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Turkish border, in October 2014, Turkey was motionless.549 This indifferent attitude not only 
irritated the PYD leader Muslim, who accused Turkey’s Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) of colluding with ISIS to eliminate the Kurds, but also undermined the AKP’s 
credibility among its own Kurdish population.550 Moreover, prior to the battle to retake al-
Raqqa from ISIS in 2016, Turkey wanted to replace the YPG-dominated SDF to fight 
alongside the U.S. and achieve “a high-profile victory” in Raqqa.551 Erdogan said to Obama 
in October 2016 that an alliance between Turkey and the U.S. had sufficient power to defeat 
ISIS and they did not need “terror organizations like the PYD and the YPG in Raqqa.”552 
Although it would indeed be helpful to partner with a NATO ally, the U.S. ignored Erdogan’s 
suggestion.553 The SDF’s solid track record of combating ISIS and the familiarity established 
during previous cooperation made SDF a preferable choice.554 Besides, the U.S. needed the 
SDF to move deeper and to fight ISIS in Deir al-Zor, one of ISIS’s last few holdings.555 The 
U.S. dismissal of Turkey’s lobbying gave rise to discontent in the AKP, which blamed the 
U.S. for prioritizing its relationship with the PYD over the territorial integrity of Turkey.556 
Meanwhile, the AKP and the PKK continued to engage in skirmishes.557 The PKK attacked 
Turkish state institutions in 2016; Turkey launched airstrike against the YPG in northeastern 
Syria in April 2017, which forced the U.S. to conduct border patrol to prevent more clashes; 
and the SDF had to suspend their offensive on ISIS in November 2018 due to attacks from 
Turkey on Syrian Kurds in northern Syria.558  
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Caught up in the conflict among Turkey, the PKK, and the Syrian Kurds, the U.S. found 
it hard to balance its interests and allegiances. On one hand, the U.S. needed the PYD, which 
had proven to be very militarily effective and capable, to eliminate ISIS. On the other hand, 
the U.S. could not ignore the protest from its NATO ally.559 In the short-term, the U.S. could 
use the Turkish Incirlik air base to launch its aerial campaign, while in the long-term, Turkey 
is of great strategic importance to the U.S.560 From the Kurds’ perspective, the U.S. rhetoric 
of describing its relationship with the YPG as “temporary, transactional, and tactical” in May 
2017, its decision to stop arms supply for the PYD after the victory in al-Raqqa, and the U.S. 
acquiescence to Turkey’s frequent bombing of the SDF were clear signals of the U.S.’s 
limited will to commit to a long-term relationship with the PYD after the defeat of ISIS.561  
Toward the end of 2018, Turkey constantly threatened to invade the Kurd-controlled 
parts of northern Syria.562 President Donald Trump’s order to withdraw the 2,000 American 
troops from Syria on December 19 further unnerved the Kurds.563 Without the deterrence 
provided by the U.S. military presence, the Syrian Kurds were, once again, surrounded by the 
Russia- and Iran-backed Assad regime and the increasingly hostile Turkey.564 In response, the 
Kurds reached out to the Assad regime on December 28 for protection against Turkey.565 The 
Assad regime had long wanted to regain control over northern Syria but had been deterred by 
the U.S. presence.566 Reconciliation with the Assad regime would significantly strengthen 
Russia and Iran’s power, which could undermine the U.S. influence in the region.567 The 
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Syrian Kurds’ decision to reach out to Assad without informing the U.S. could be seen as a 
strategy to threaten the U.S. and send the message that if the U.S. abandoned the Kurds, they 
could easily turn to the enemies.568 Such a strategy led to Trump’s threat to impose economic 
sanctions on Turkey as a response to the Turkish military buildup on the border in January 
2019, his decision to leave 200 American troops in Syria in February, and discussions in the 
Pentagon to allow the Kurds to keep the American-supplied weapons.569 To sum up, when the 
U.S. limited will for long-term commitment became obvious, the Kurds leveraged other 
players, including the Assad regime, Russia and Iran, to influence the U.S. decision of 
withdrawal from Syria.  
Diverging Objectives   
The third factor in the theoretical framework is about diverging objectives. According to 
Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham, agency slack, which means local forces have 
incentives to escape from the external powers’ control so that they could have more 
autonomy to pursue their own objectives, exists in the relationship between external powers 
and local forces. The problem would be more significant if the objectives of the two actors 
severely misalign, which was indeed the case in the relationship between the U.S. and the 
Kurds.  
Around 30 million Kurds are currently residing in four countries: Syria, Iraq, Turkey and 
Iran.570 After the Ottoman Empire disintegrated during the First World War, the Kurds were 
given the chance to hold an independent referendum, as specified in the 1920 Treaty of 
Sevres.571 However, Treaty of Sevres was re-negotiated between the new Turkish 
government, which came to power after Turkey’s war of independence in 1923, and the 
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Allies.572 The re-negotiation granted Turkey sovereignty over the otherwise potentially 
independent Kurdistan, and subsequently, gave rise to Kurdish nationalism and the persistent 
demand for independence in the region.573  
During the 20th century, the Kurdish population in the four countries all organized 
insurgencies and caused serious problems for their host governments in one way or 
another.574 The Turkish Kurds organized three rebellions in 1925, 1930, and 1938, which 
were all crushed by the Turkish government.575 The most recent rebellious movements have 
been headed by the PKK, which has haunted the AKP for almost three decades.576 Iran was 
troubled by the Kurds in 1946, when the Soviet-backed Iranian Kurds “established the first 
genuine Kurdish government.”577 Though the government only existed for a year, it was still 
a serious attempt to break away from the Iranian rule.578 As for Iraq, their Kurdish population 
were used by Iran – their protracted enemy – to fight against the Iraqi government during the 
1960s and 1970s.579 Iran abandoned the Kurds in 1975 after making a deal with Saddam 
Hussein over “the sharing of the Shatt al-Arab, the waterway in which the Tigris and 
Euphrates converge as they approach the Gulf.”580 The Shah of Iran exchanged Iran’s support 
of the Kurds for the control over “the deepest point” of the river.581 In terms of the Syrian 
Kurds, their major movement toward independence started during the Syrian civil war.582  
In response to the Kurdish rebellions, which posed a significant security threat to 
national interests and territorial integrity, all four host countries adopted measures to repress 
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the Kurdish population.583 Turkey, Iran, and Syria all banned Kurdish language, schools, and 
organizations.584 Turkey burned down villages; Iraq slaughtered Kurds during its 1988 Anfal 
counterinsurgency campaign; and Syria “revoked the citizenship of tens of thousands of 
Syrian Kurds” in the 1960s.585 Despite all these atrocities, the Kurds have never perceived 
themselves as a minority and have continued to hold onto their ambition of independence and 
autonomy.586 The Iranian and Turkish Kurds are both under close surveillance and strict 
control by their governments, which gives them few chances to acquire power and gain 
autonomy.587 The Iraqi and Syrian Kurds, on the other hand, have effectively exploited the 
chaos during the civil war and manipulated the U.S. support while fighting ISIS, thus making 
significant progress since 2011.588 In terms of territory held, U.S. support enabled the Iraqi 
and the Syrian Kurds to not only keep their previous territories but also acquire new ones 
after throwing out ISIS.589 The KRG captured new territories that were of great symbolic and 
cultural value to the Kurds and also took control over the valuable Mosul dam after defeating 
ISIS in Sinjar in November 2015.590 By mid-2017, the land captured during the process of 
fighting ISIS amounted to more than half of KRG’s own territory before the war. From the 
KRG’s perspective, the newly acquired territory was a part of the “disputed territory subject 
to Kurdish claim,” which means they intended to keep all of them.591  
The territorial gain was even more significant for the Syrian Kurds. Before the war, the 
three Kurdish cantons – Jazira, Kobani, and Afrin – were widely separated, adjacent to 
unfriendly Sunni Arab factions, and had no access to the Syrian-Turkish border.592 Jazira and 
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Kobani had no geographical depth, which made them easy to penetrate and conquer.593 The 
Kurds also had to tolerate the presence of the regime’s intelligence service in Jazira.594 After 
the U.S. started supporting the PYD to fight ISIS, the PYD took advantage of the U.S. air 
power and the “U.S. veto against Turkish interference” to substitute ISIS on the land that 
would connect the three cantons.595 The SDF, with support from the U.S. airstrikes and the 
Special Forces advisers, defeated ISIS and captured the land in the Manbij district in August 
2016, which filled in the gap between Afrin and Kobani cantons.596 Turkey was furious about 
the PYD’s expansion in territory and retaliated through shelling the SDF and channeling 
more ISIS fighters into Syria.597 These behaviors provoked warnings from both the U.S. and 
Russia.598 By December 2018, the SDF controlled about a quarter of Syria with oil fields, 
agriculture, and three major cities, which represented an unprecedented expansion of territory 
and power.599  
In addition to the territorial gain, the Syrian Kurds also achieved much greater cohesion 
among their previously divided factions and benefited from more international recognition, 
legitimacy and support.600 Henri Barkey argues that the existential threat as a result of ISIS’s 
attacks brought the Kurdish factions together.601 The experience of jointly fighting a common 
enemy could facilitate military and political integration among the Kurds, which could 
contribute to the formation of “pan-Kurdish military units” and identities.602 Moreover, he 
also points out that fighting alongside the U.S. has made the PYD famous and the Kurdish 
plea well-known in the West, especially in Europe.603 The KRG received diplomatic 
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recognition from the U.S., France, and Britain, which represented an unprecedentedly high 
level of international recognition and legitimacy.604 In terms of the revival of Kurdish 
language and culture, both the KRG and the PYD introduced Kurdish language education in 
areas under their control.605 In sum, the Iraqi and the Syrian Kurds emerged from the Syrian 
civil war much more powerful in all aspects, including territorial holdings, international 
legitimacy, and soft power. Their expansion of power was mostly a result of U.S. support 
while fighting ISIS. While Kurds have become more powerful, they have more potential to 
achieve independence and autonomy in the Middle East, which, in fact, would go against the 
U.S. interests in the region.  
An independent Kurdistan or the Kurds acquiring more power in the region would 
drastically change the balance of power in the Middle East and lead to instability in Iraq, 
Syria, Turkey, and Iran, which are not in the U.S. interests.606 In Iraq, the KRG leader 
Massoud Barzani’s decision to hold a referendum on Kurdish independence created a chaos 
not only between Baghdad and Erbil but also among the external powers in late 2017.607 
Though the result of the referendum, which showed that the majority voted for independence, 
would not be legally binding, the U.S., UK and Russia all urged the KRG to postpone while 
Iraq, Iran, and Turkey imposed “economic, security and diplomatic sanctions” to pressure the 
KRG to cancel the referendum.608 The fact that this referendum was initiated by the Kurdish 
government and the KRG had gained so much power and territories through fighting ISIS 
made the Kurdish independence threat real.609 When the threat was no longer simply an issue 
on paper, the integrity of Iraq was prioritized over the independence of Iraqi Kurdistan.610  
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Although the KRG’s autonomy was specified in the constitution and Iraqi Prime 
Minister Haider al-Abadi did “acknowledge independence as the natural right of Kurds” in 
April 2017, he still demanded the referendum be cancelled and even threatened to deploy 
Iraqi troops.611 And it was not an empty threat. One month after the referendum, the Iraqi 
government, with support from Iran and Turkey, sent in troops to invade Iraqi Kurdistan, 
which cost the KRG one-fifth of its territory, including Kirkuk and the oil fields in the 
region.612 Facing the rising tension between the Iraqi government and the Kurds, Turkey 
chose to back the Iraqi government, despite its improved relationship and economic 
cooperation with the KRG in the past few years.613 The Turkish Foreign Ministry called the 
referendum “a grave mistake” in June, and Erdogan even sent Turkish Foreign Minister to 
persuade Barzani “not to make this mistake.”614 Turkey’s mediation, however, was rejected 
by Barzani, which angered Erdogan, since the KRG’s rejection undermined his image as an 
influential leader in the region.615 Moreover, Turkey found the KRG’s inclusion of Kirkuk in 
the referendum unacceptable.616 The KRG saw Kirkuk as the Kurdish “Jerusalem” while 
Erdogan perceived it as “a Turkmen city” and described the KRG’s control over the city as 
“an act of occupation” that deliberately provoked Turkish sensitivities.617 On the day of the 
referendum, Erdogan dismissed the result of the referendum as “null, void and illegitimate,” 
launched a military exercise along the border, and then closed airspace to the KRG.618 As for 
Iran, it banned all air traffic from Iran to Iraqi Kurdistan the day before the referendum, upon 
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the request of the Iraqi government, which is currently in Shi'a Arabs’ control.619 In sum, 
both Turkey and Iran were concerned about a change of status quo in Iraq, which could 
produce crises along their borders.620 Their tough attitude and strong response could also be 
intended to deter the PYD in Syria and their own Kurdish population.621 
Apparently, the Iraqi Kurds tried to use this referendum to leverage their newly acquired 
international reputation to attract more attention and support.622 This attempt already created 
conflict and built up tension in the region.623 If the KRG continues to use its increased power 
to pursue independence, sectarian tensions will continue to grow in the Middle East, which 
could lead to fighting and instability in Iraq.624 Additionally, the U.S. will have to deal with 
Turkey’s growing grievances.625 Even though Trump dispatched a Special Presidential Envoy 
to offer Barzani a way out and reiterated the U.S. rejection of the referendum during his 
meeting with Erdogan in September 2017, Turkey was not satisfied.626 The referendum re-
kindled Ankara’s long-standing suspicion since the First Gulf War in 1991 that the U.S. 
intends to build an independent Kurdish state along Turkey’s border, which would eventually 
stretch to include the Turkish southeastern provinces.627 Ironically, the KRG, the 
destabilizing factor in this intense dynamic among Iraq, Turkey, and the U.S., was a product 
of the first Gulf War.628 It came to power through cooperating with the U.S. during the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 and became more powerful due to U.S. support to fight ISIS.629 As 
shown by the U.S. reaction to the KRG referendum, the U.S. does not support the 
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independence of the Kurds in Iraq.630 In other words, the U.S. own creation, strengthened by 
U.S. support, is now pursuing objectives against the U.S. interests.  
Similar to the case in Iraq, the PYD-headed Democratic Federation of Northern Syria 
(DFNS)’s ambition to acquire autonomy in Syria and the PYD’s attempts to trade territories 
with the Russian- and Iran-backed Assad regime would both jeopardize U.S. interests.631 The 
DFNS was established in March 2016, and was previously known as the Cantons of 
Rojava.632 The DFNS is currently in charge of the Kurd-controlled cantons in Syria and 
hopes to achieve not only autonomy for the Kurds but also pluralist democratic rule in Syria, 
where “the rights of all the ethnic and religious minorities” will be recognized.633 This vision 
already faced pushback in Tell Abyad, Manbij, and al-Raqqa.634 The population in these areas 
refused to recognize the Kurdish government, saw it as serving the interests of the Kurds, and 
set up civilian councils to take over administration and governance.635 In addition to domestic 
obstacles, Turkey also had no stomach for another autonomous Kurdistan on its border.636 
According to Barkey, Turkey was worried about the U.S. granting the Syrian Kurds rights for 
self-governance, which would give rise to “a second KRG.”637 Having two self-governed 
Kurdistans on its border is not acceptable for Turkey, not to mention that one of them is 
affiliated with the PKK.638 In order to prevent the DFNS from establishing “a terror state,” 
Turkey has been willing and ready to deploy the military.639 Turkey already attacked the 
Syrian Kurds on several occasions during the war.640 For instance, Turkey air bombed the 
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YPG in April 2016 and, in November, supported the FSA to prevent the SDF from taking al-
Bab, a city that would connect the Afrin canton with the Kobani canton.641 These attacks 
showed Turkey’s resolve to invade, which could give rise to fighting among the PYD, Turkey, 
and possibly intervention from Iran and Russia.642 Such a conflict, involving “an armed 
revolutionary nationalist movement” attached to the terrorist group PKK, a U.S. ally ready 
and capable of “wiping out a credible threat to its territorial integrity,” and two foreign 
powers aiming at greater influence in the Middle East, is not in the U.S. interests.643 Besides, 
chaos or another power vacuum could easily lead to the re-emergence of ISIS, which was just 
rooted out in the region.  
Prior to the U.S. withdrawal, the Syrian Kurds relied on the U.S. presence to deter a 
Turkish invasion.644 Trump’s abrupt decision to withdraw in December 2018 made the Kurds 
feel betrayed and abandoned.645 In response, the PYD immediately turned to Russia and 
Assad for protection.646 Though a negotiation between the Kurds and Assad is expected, a 
deal constructed while the Kurds have unprecedented control of territories and resources, yet 
no international or regional support, would not align well with U.S. strategic interests.647 If 
the Syrian Kurds continue to allow the regime troops to enter Kurd-controlled territory, as 
they did in December 2018 when they invited Syrian armies to enter Manbij, it would not 
only make Assad’s goal to recover all lost land in Syria much easier to achieve, but also 
significantly benefit both Russia and Iran.648 Russia saw the oil fields in northern Syria as 
valuable assets that would help Assad’s reconstruction, while Iran wanted to create a path 
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that would “connect forces it supports in Syria and Lebanon with those in Iraq.”649 During a 
meeting with the Kurds in February 2019, the Assad regime refused to grant the Syrian Kurds 
autonomy.650 Despite Assad’s refusal, northern Syria is currently under PYD self-rule and the 
large amount of territory gives the Kurds leverage to negotiate. The result of such a 
negotiation, however, may not necessarily be in the U.S. interests.  
As demonstrated above, the Iraqi Kurds’ ambition for independence and the Syrian 
Kurds’ goal of autonomy both contradict the U.S. objectives. In other words, the U.S. was 
pursuing a somewhat self-contradictory policy: the U.S. wanted the Kurds to be strong so that 
they could defeat ISIS, but the U.S. did not want them to be so strong that they could fight for 
independence. The KRG’s referendum and the PYD’s negotiations with Assad both show 
that the Kurds are wielding their growing power to pursue their own objectives at the expense 
of U.S. interests. What is more interesting is the proposal made by U.S. commanders, who 
suggested that the Kurds should be allowed to keep U.S.-supplied weapons.651 Such a 
proposal was motivated by two factors. First, since Trump’s decision to withdraw was 
criticized as stabbing the Kurds in the back, letting the YPG fighters keep the weapons could 
serve as a reassurance that they were not abandoned.652 Second, it would be nearly impossible 
for the U.S. to locate and recover all the weapons anyway.653 There were few strings attached 
when the arms were delivered to the Kurds.654 After sending the weapons to the Peshmerga, 
the U.S.-led coalition did not track the end-use or follow up on the distribution of the 
weapons, in fear of interfering with the KRG’s sovereignty.655 Whether the Kurds will be 
allowed to keep the weapons remains an undecided issue. If Trump adopts the Pentagon’s 
                                                 
649 Ibid. 
650 Andrew Osborn, "Assad Adviser Rejects Idea of Granting Syrian Kurds Autonomy." Reuters. February 19, 
2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-adviser/assad-adviser-rejects-idea-of-granting-
syrian-kurds-autonomy-idUSKCN1Q81QA.  
651 "US Commanders Propose Kurdish Fighters in Syria Keep Weapons." 
652 Ibid. 
653 Ibid. 
654 "Arming Iraq’s Kurds: Fighting IS, Inviting Conflict," 20. 
655 Ibid. 
  89 
proposal, the YPG will have a variety of advanced U.S. weapons, including “anti-tank 
missiles, armored vehicles and mortars,” that can be used to forward an agenda at odds with 
U.S. interests.656  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
To sum up, despite significant power disadvantages, local forces can not only break free 
from external powers’ control but also effectively manipulate external support to pursue their 
own objectives because they have practical advantages, a stronger will to fight, and diverging 
objectives from the external power. In terms of practical advantage, local forces have a more 
extensive local presence and networks, better knowledge about the local power dynamic, and 
greater legitimacy in the local sphere. These characteristics make local forces desirable 
partners during intervention, which consequently, gives them leverage over external powers. 
Second, local forces have a much stronger will to fight than external powers because they 
have higher stakes involved in the conflict. The fact that local forces have troops on the 
ground, more than likely fighting for survival, justifies the deployment of all their resources 
and personnel. The external powers, however, are insulated from the fighting, since their 
security and survival are not under threat. Given the absence of an imminent threat and the 
overwhelming power advantage, the constituents or elites of the external power, depending 
on the regime type, will demand a quick victory to justify the necessity and benefits of the 
intervention. Such a demand, a political vulnerability, can constrain the external power’s will, 
which could serve as a signal for the local forces that the patronage relationship will not be 
long-term. If local forces perceive the relationship and support as short-term, they will not 
worry much about the repercussions of sabotaging the relationship and will be more likely to 
manipulate the support to pursue their own objectives, if given the chance. Third, the 
relationship between external powers and local forces suffers from the problem of agency 
slack, which tends to be more serious when the objectives of the two actors severely misalign. 
The misalignment of objectives would then create incentives for the local forces to 
manipulate external support to pursue their own objectives, which could be against the 
interests of their patrons.  
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The three factors identified above are then applied and examined in two cases. First, 
Cuba effectively manipulated support from the Soviet Union during the intervention in the 
Angolan civil war in 1975. Cuba, as “a self-motivated international paladin,” acted within the 
parameters of the Soviet strategic interests, while at the same time pursuing its own 
objectives, which did not necessarily align with the Soviet objectives in Africa. Its long-term 
military presence in Africa before the civil war and its identity as a Third World state enabled 
Cuba to build special ties with African countries. Compared to the Soviet Union, a 
superpower during the Cold War, Cuba’s presence in Angola was more welcoming and 
enjoyed higher legitimacy. Moreover, after the outbreak of the civil war, Cuba deployed 
military advisers and troops to fight alongside the MPLA, through which Cuba exerted great 
influence on the MPLA’s military strategies and policies. In sum, Cuba’s long-standing 
military presence in the region, legitimacy among African countries, and deployment of 
military personnel to support the MPLA all contributed to its practical advantages over the 
Soviet Union. In terms of relative will, Cuba, though not a local force facing an existential 
threat, still had stronger will to fight due to its military presence on the ground. For the Soviet 
Union, southern Africa was not a high priority; the Soviet strategic interests in Africa focused 
on northern Africa and the Horn of Africa. Additionally, Soviet will was constrained by the 
fact that the Soviets were concerned about the intervention disrupting détente and again 
leading to high tensions in the relationship with the U.S. The Soviets’ limited interests in 
Angola and southern Africa, however, could lead to an unfavorable situation for Cuba. 
Cuba’s leverage and value would diminish; the Soviet support would decrease; and Cuba’s 
revolutionary mission in Africa would be hard to sustain. Consequently, Cuba had a strong 
incentive to escape Soviet control and to effectively use the Soviet support to win battles in 
Angola, through which the Soviet Union could appreciate Cuba’s value and be more willing 
to invest in interventions in the region. More interventions in Africa would then lead to a 
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closer alliance between the Soviet Union and Cuba, which meant that Cuba could continue to 
benefit from Soviet support to pursue its own objectives in the region. Evidence shows that 
Cuba not only broke free from the Soviet dominance – Cuba forced fait accompli upon the 
Soviets in several occasions during the intervention – but also manipulated Soviet support to 
forward its own interests. Cuba obtained more military and economic support from the Soviet 
Union, enjoyed greater autonomy in its alliance with the Soviets, achieved higher status in the 
Third World, and actively influenced the Soviet Union’s Africa policies.  
Interestingly, in another external power-local force patronage relationship in the 
Angolan civil war – the relationship between the U.S. and South Africa – South 
Africa, which was the local force in this case because it deployed troops to support the FNLA 
in Angola, failed to manipulate the U.S. support to forward its own interests. The U.S. 
encouraged and supported South Africa’s decision to invade Angola to support the FNLA in 
fighting the Soviet and Cuba-backed MPLA.657 After the U.S. involvement in this widely 
condemned invasion was made public, the U.S. immediately ended “any de facto alliance 
with South Africa” and stopped providing aid to Angola.658 In fear of Angola turning into a 
second Vietnam, then-US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger claimed that the U.S. did not 
collude with South Africa.659 This claim, however, was refuted by the South Africans, who 
argued that the U.S. assured African countries that their efforts to fight against Soviet-backed 
forces in Angola would receive continuous U.S. support.660 With the U.S. clearly distancing 
itself, South Africa was forced to bear the military and political costs of defeats against Cuba 
in Angola.661 Facing both domestic opposition and international condemnation, South Africa 
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could do nothing more than blame the U.S. for abandoning it as an instrument.662 In this case, 
the weaker partner, South Africa, had no opportunity to manipulate the U.S. and, in fact, it 
could be argued that it was itself manipulated. 
The second case is about the U.S. supporting the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds to fight ISIS in 
Syria and Iraq during the Syrian civil war. The U.S. directly intervened in Syria in September 
2014 through an aerial campaign to fight ISIS. However, in order to defeat ISIS, an aerial 
campaign was not enough. The U.S. needed ground troops, preferably local forces, for both 
practical and political reasons. Practically, ground troops were essential to hold territories 
recovered from ISIS, to gather human intelligence, to better understand the local power 
dynamic, and more importantly, to serve as an alternative to ISIS to provide authority for the 
local population. Among multiple local forces engaged in the civil war, the U.S. chose to 
back the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds because they are more homogenous, well-organized, and 
militarily capable. Moreover, the Kurds’ identity as a minority group facing an existential 
threat, as a result of ISIS’s attack, made the narrative of supporting the Kurds acceptable and 
popular among the western governments and public. The U.S. long-standing relationship with 
the KRG also made the Kurds relatively trustworthy. As a result, the U.S. started supporting 
the Kurds, who turned out to be very effective in fighting ISIS. With the U.S. support, Kurds 
defeated ISIS and kept the reclaimed territories, through which the Kurds’ territorial holdings 
significantly increased. In comparison, the Kurds had a stronger will to fight than the U.S. did 
in Syria. Both the Syrian and the Iraqi Kurds faced an existential threat before the U.S. 
intervention, which made it easy to justify the deployment of all of their resources and 
personnel. The U.S., however, was not challenged by any imminent threat. Its will was 
further constrained by public opinion – mostly against another intervention in the Middle 
East – and the U.S. alliance with Turkey. Turkey strongly opposed U.S. support for the 
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Syrian Kurds, whom the Turks saw as affiliated with the PKK, the terrorist group that has 
been trying to gain independence and divide Turkey since the 1980s. Protest and pressure 
from Turkey forced the U.S. to maintain a delicate balance between supporting the Syrian 
Kurds – the only meaningful ally on the ground in fighting ISIS – and Turkey, an important 
NATO ally. The U.S. conceded to Turkey’s pressure and stopped arms supplies for the 
Syrian Kurds after the Kurds defeated ISIS in al-Raqqa, ISIS’s capital in Syria. This served 
as a signal for the Syrian Kurds that the U.S. was not willing to make a long-term 
commitment, which therefore motivated the Kurds to sabotage the relationship and 
manipulate the short-term support to achieve their own objectives. Unlike the U.S.’s 
constantly fluctuating objectives in the Middle East, Kurds have a clear set of objectives: to 
acquire independence or autonomy. Through the alliance with the U.S. while fighting ISIS, 
Kurds acquired an unprecedented amount of power and territory, which could significantly 
strengthen their potential to gain independence. Neither an independent Kurdistan, or the 
Kurds wielding their newly acquired power in the Middle East, however, are in the U.S. 
interests, however, because they can create instability in the region, especially in Iraq and 
Syria. Despite strong opposition from the U.S. and Turkey, the KRG held a referendum in 
September 2017, which could be seen as an attempt to leverage its newly acquired power and 
international legitimacy to gain more external support before the U.S. withdrawal from Syria. 
However, when the threat of an independent Kurdistan became real, the U.S. and the regional 
powers, especially Turkey and Iran, prioritized the territorial integrity of Iraq over the 
independence of the Kurds. In response to the referendum, Iraq invaded the Iraqi Kurds, 
Turkey started border patrol, and Iran closed airspace to the KRG. Apparently, tension had 
already been building up in Iraq as Kurds acquired more power. The Syrian Kurds, on the 
other hand, wanted to achieve autonomy in a federal Syria, which is not acceptable for the 
Assad regime or Turkey. Assad has always wanted to reclaim all the territories in Syria and 
  95 
already refused the Kurds’ request for autonomy. As for Turkey, with the autonomous Iraqi 
Kurdistan already on its border, Turkey could not tolerate another one in Syria, not to 
mention the PYD’s affiliation to the PKK. Turkey attacked the Syrian Kurds several times 
while the U.S. was still supporting the Kurds in fighting ISIS. After the U.S. withdrawal, 
Turkey’s threat to invade the Syrian Kurds becomes more imminent. If Turkey decides to 
invade, it would be another bloody war that would once again give rise to chaos and a power 
vacuum in Syria, which could easily lead to ISIS’s resurgence in the region. The Syrian 
Kurds already started negotiating with the Assad regime to exchange territory for protection 
against Turkey. Given Russia and Iran’s support for the Assad regime, it would be hard to 
imagine that they would settle on an agreement that is not in their best interests. An 
expansion of Russian and/or Iranian influence in the Middle East, however, is not in U.S. 
interests. Apparently, the Kurds are using the power, acquired while fighting ISIS, to pursue 
their own objectives in the Middle East, which has already led to instability in the region. 
What’s more interesting is the proposals made by the Pentagon to let the Kurds keep U.S.-
supplied weapons, which means the Kurds could walk away with U.S. support to continue 
engaging in activities that would jeopardize U.S. interests.  
Among the three factors that enable local forces to manipulate external powers’ support, 
diverging objectives is the most important. While practical advantage gives local forces 
leverage and makes them useful partners for external powers, and stronger will gives local 
forces another advantage to close the significant power gap, it is diverging objectives that 
provides local forces with motivations and incentives to exploit and manipulate the support. 
If the objectives of these two actors perfectly align, such an exploitation and manipulation 
will not happen.  
In general, the three factors – practical advantage, relative will, and diverging objectives 
– apply well in explaining the dynamic between the Soviet Union and Cuba in Angola, and 
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the relationship between the U.S. and the Kurds while fighting ISIS. However, two cases are 
not sufficient to generalize about the power dynamic in all proxy relationships. As briefly 
mentioned above, South Africa was merely an instrument of the U.S. while intervening in 
Angola. Consequently, further research and discussion are necessary to explore under what 
conditions manipulation would be more likely to happen and be successful. 
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